Showing posts with label commodity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commodity. Show all posts

Thursday, January 22, 2015

A Five Year Forecast: Is this a Tsunami Warning?

By John Mauldin

It is the time of the year for forecasts; but rather than do an annual forecast, which is as much a guessing game as anything else (and I am bad at guessing games), I’m going to do a five year forecast to take us to the end of the decade, which I think may be useful for longer term investors. We will focus on events and trends that I think have a high probability, and I’ll state what I think the probabilities are for my forecasts to actually happen. While I could provide several dozen items, I think there are seven major trends that are going to sweep over the globe and that as an investor you need to have on your radar screen. You will need to approach these trends with caution, but they will also provide significant opportunities.

There is a book in here somewhere, but I do not intend to write one today. In fact, my New Year’s resolution is to write shorter letters in 2015. Over the last decade and a half, the letter has tended to get longer. A little more here, a little more there, and pretty soon it just gets to be a bit too much to read in one sitting. That means I need to either be more concise, break up my topics into two sessions or, if further writing is necessary, post the additional work on the website for those interested.

Take a minute to grab our free eBook "Understanding Options" while it's still available.....Just Click Here

So I’m writing today’s letter in that spirit. Each of the major topics we’ll be covering will show up in other letters over the next few months. I would appreciate your feedback and any links to articles and/or data points that you think I should know about regarding these topics.

But first, this is generally the most downloaded letter of the year. I want to invite new readers to become one of my 1 million closest friends by simply entering your email address here. You can follow my work throughout the year, absolutely free (and see how my prognostications are turning out). And if you’re a regular reader, why not send this to a few of your friends and suggest they join you? At the very least, Thoughts from the Frontline should make for some interesting conversations this year. Thanks. Now let’s get on with the forecasting.

Seven Significant Changes for the Next Five Years

Let’s look at what I think are six inexorable trends or waves that will each have a major impact in its own right but that when taken together will amount to a tsunami of change for the global economy.

1. Japan will continue its experiment with the most radical quantitative easing attempted by a major country in the history of the world… and the experiment is getting dangerous. The Bank of Japan is effectively exporting the island nation’s deflation to its trade competitors like Germany, China, and South Korea and inviting a currency war that could shake the world. I’ve been saying this for years now, but the story took a nasty turn on Halloween Day, when the Bank of Japan announced it was greatly expanding and changing the mix of its asset purchases. The results have been downright scary, and a major slide in the JPY/USD exchange rate is almost certain over the next five years. I give it a 90% probability. All this while the population of Japan shrinks before our very eyes.

2. Europe is headed for a crisis at least as severe as the Grexit scare was in 2012 – and for the resulting run-up in interest rates and a sovereign debt scare in the peripheral countries. After all these years of struggle, the structural flaws in the EMU’s design remain; and now major economies like Italy and France are headed for trouble. In the very near future we will finally know the answer to the question, “Is the euro a currency or an experiment?” The changes required to answer that question will be wrenching and horrifically expensive. There are no good answers, only difficult choices about who pays how much and to whom. Again, I see the deepening of the Eurozone crisis as a 90% probability.

3. China is approaching its day of reckoning as it tries to reduce its dependency on debt in its bid for growth, while creating a consumer society. The world is simply not prepared for China to experience an outright “hard landing” or recession, but I think there is a 70% probability that it will do so within the next five years.

And the probability that China will suffer either a hard landing OR a long period of Japanese style stagnation (in the event that the Chinese government is forced to absorb nonperforming loans to prevent a debt crisis) is over 95%. To be sure, it is still quite possible that the Chinese economy will be significantly larger in 2025 (ten years from now) than it is today, but realizing that potential largely depends on President Xi Jinping’s ability to accomplish an extremely difficult task: deleveraging the debt overhang that threatens the country’s MASSIVE financial system while rebalancing the national economy to a more sustainable growth model (either through either a vast expansion of China’s export market or the rapid development of “new economy” sectors like technology, services, and consumption; or both).

This will not be the end of China, which I’m quite bullish on over the very long term, but such transitions are never easy. Even given this rather stark forecast, it is still likely (in my opinion) that the Chinese economy will be 20 to 25% bigger as 2020 opens than it is today; and every other major economy in the world (including the US) would be thrilled to have such growth. At the very least, though, China’s slowdown and rebalancing is going to put pressure on commodity exporters, which are generally emerging markets plus Australia, Canada, and Norway.

4. All of the above will tend to be bullish for the dollar, which will make dollar-denominated debt in emerging market countries more difficult to pay back. And given the amount of debt that has been created in the last few years, it is likely that we’ll see a series of crises in emerging-market countries, along with an uncomfortably high level of risk of setting off an LTCM-style global financial shock.

My colleague Worth Wray spoke about this new era of volatile FX flows and growing risk of capital flight from emerging markets at my Strategic Investor Conference last May, and he has continued to remind us of those risks in recent months (“A Scary Story for Emerging Markets” and “Why the World Needs the US Economy to Struggle”).

Now that Russia has tumbled into a full-fledged currency crisis with serious signs of contagion, Worth’s prediction is already playing out, and I would assign an 80 to 90% probability that it will continue to do so, as a function of (1) the rising US dollar and a reversal in cross border capital flows, (2) falling commodity prices, or (3) both. This massive wave is going to create a lot of opportunities for courageous investors who are ready to surf when countries are cheap.

5. I do not believe that the secular bear market in the United States that I began to describe in 1999 has ended. Secular bull markets simply do not begin from valuations like those we have today. Either we began a secular bull market in 2009, or we have one more major correction in front of us.

Obviously, I think it is the latter. It has been some time since I’ve discussed the difference between secular bull and bear markets and cyclical bull and bear markets, and I will briefly touch on the topic today and go into much more detail in later letters. For US focused investors, this is of major importance. The secular bear is not something to be scared of but simply something to be played. It also offers a great deal of opportunity.

If I am right, then the next major leg down will bring on the end of the secular bear and the beginning of a very long term secular bull. We will all get to be geniuses in the 2020s and perhaps even before the last half of this decade runs out. Won’t that be fun? Let’s call the end of the secular bear a 90% probability in five years and move on.

6. Finally, the voters of the United States are going to have to make a decision about the direction they want to take the country. We can either opt for growth, which will mean a new tax and regulatory regime, or we can double down on the current direction and become Europe and Japan. I’ve traveled to both Europe and Japan, and they’re both pleasant enough places to live, but I wouldn’t want to be a citizen of either Japan or the Eurozone for the rest of this decade. (I particularly love Italy, but it is beginning to resemble a basket case, with last year’s optimistic drive for reforms seemingly stalled.)

However, I would rather live and work and invest in a high-growth country, with opportunities all around me, a country where we reduce income inequality by increasing wealth and opportunities at the lower end of the income scale instead of trying to legislate parity by increasing taxes and imposing government mandated wealth redistribution, which slows growth and squelches opportunity for everyone.

A restructuring of the US tax and regulatory regime does not mean a capitulation to the wealthy, big banks, or big business. Properly conceived and constructed, it will allow the renewal of the middle class and result in higher income for all. Sadly, it is not clear to me that either the Republican or Democratic parties are up to the task of making the difficult political decisions necessary. They each have constituencies that tend to opt for the status quo. But I see hope on both sides of the political spectrum that change is possible. The course they set will give us an idea where we will want to focus our portfolios in the decade of the ’20s. It is a 100% probability that we will have to make a decision. It is less than 50% that we will make the right one – or at least the one that I think is the right one.

7.  We have entered the Age of Transformation. We’re going to see the development of new technologies that will simply astound us – from increasingly capable robots and other applications of AI to huge breakthroughs in biotechnology.

The winners are going to be those who identified the truly transformational technologies early on in their development and invested wisely. While riskier (potentially far riskier) than most of your investments should be, a basket of new-technology stocks should be considered for the growth part of your portfolio. I see the Age of Transformation as a 100% probability.

Just for the record, I also see a continuation of the global deflationary environment and a slowing of the velocity of money until we have some type of resolution concerning sovereign debt. Central banks will continue to try to solve the “crises” I mentioned above with monetary policy, but monetary policy will simply not be enough to stem the tide. Central banks can paddle as hard as they like into the waves of change, but they cannot reverse their powerful flow.

Now, let’s look further at each of the waves that are forming into a potential tsunami.

To continue reading this article from Thoughts from the Frontline – a free weekly publication by John Mauldin, renowned financial expert, best-selling author, and Chairman of Mauldin Economics – please click here.



Get our latest FREE eBook "Understanding Options"....Just Click Here!

Sunday, December 21, 2014

Why Russia Will Halt the Ruble’s Slide and Keep Pumping Crude Oil

By Marin Katusa, Chief Energy Investment Strategist

The harsh reality is that U.S. shale fields have much more to fear from plummeting oil prices than the Russians, since their costs of production are much higher, says Marin Katusa, author of The Colder War: How the Global Energy Trade Slipped from America’s Grasp.

Russia’s ruble may have strengthened sharply Wednesday, but it’s plunge in recent days has encouraged plenty of talk about the country’s catastrophe, with some even proclaiming that the new Russia is about to go the way of the old USSR.

Don’t believe it. Russia is not the United States, and the effects of a rapidly declining currency over there are much less dramatic than they would be in the U.S.

One important thing to remember is that the fall of the ruble has accompanied a precipitous decline in the per barrel price of oil. But the two are not as intimately connected as might be supposed. Yes, Russia has a resource based economy that is hurt by oil weakness. However, oil is traded nearly everywhere in U.S. dollars, which are presently enjoying considerable strength.

This means that Russian oil producers can sell their product in these strong dollars but pay their expenses in devalued rubles. Thus, they can make capital improvements, invest in new capacity, or do further explorations for less than it would have cost before the ruble’s value was halved against the dollar. The sector remains healthy, and able to continue contributing the lion’s share of governmental tax revenues.

Nor is ruble volatility going to affect the ability of most Russian companies to service their debt. Most of the dollar-denominated corporate debt that has to be rolled over in the coming months was borrowed by state companies, which have a steady stream of foreign currency revenues from oil and gas exports.

Russian consumers will be hurt, of course, due to the higher costs of imported goods, as well as the squeeze inflation puts on their incomes. But, by the same token, exports become much more attractive to foreign buyers. A cheaper ruble boosts the profit outlook for all Russian companies involved in international trade. Additionally, when the present currency weakness is added to the ban on food imports from the European Union, the two could eventually lead to an import substitution boom in Russia.

In any event, don’t expect any deprivations to inspire riots in the streets of Moscow. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s popularity has soared since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. The people trust him. They’ll tighten their belts and there will be no widespread revolt against his policies.

Further, the high price of oil during the commodity super cycle, coupled with a high real exchange rate, led to a serious decline in the Russia’s manufacturing and agricultural sectors over the past 15 years. This correlation — termed by economists “Dutch disease”— lowered the Russian manufacturing sector’s share of its economy to 8% from 21% in 2000.

The longer the ruble remains weak, however, the less Dutch disease will rule the day. A lower currency means investment in Russian manufacturing and agriculture will make good economic sense again. Both should be given a real fillip.

Low oil prices are also good for Russia’s big customers, especially China, with which Putin has been forging ever stronger ties. If, as expected, Russia and China agree to transactions in rubles and/or yuan, that will push them even closer together and further undermine the dollar’s worldwide hegemony. Putin always thinks decades ahead, and any short term loss of energy revenues will be far offset by the long term gains of his economic alliances.

In the most recent development, the Russian central bank has reacted by raising interest rates to 17%. On the one hand, this is meant to curb inflation. On the other, it’s an direct response to the short selling speculators who’ve been attacking the ruble. They now have to pay additional premiums, so the risk/reward ratio has gone up. Speculators are going to be much warier going forward.

The rise in interest rates mirrors how former U.S. Fed Chair Paul Volcker fought inflation in the U.S. in the early ‘80s. It worked for Volcker, as the U.S. stock market embarked on a historic bull run. The Russians — whose market has been beaten down during the oil/currency crisis — are expecting a similar result.

Not that the Russian market is anywhere near as important to that country’s economy as the US’s is to its. Russians don’t play the market like Americans do. There is no Jim Kramerovsky’s Mad Money in Russia.

Russia is not some Zimbabwe-to-be. It’s sitting on a surplus of foreign assets and very healthy foreign exchange reserves of around $375 billion. Moreover, it has a strong debt-to-GDP ratio of just 13% and a large (and steadily growing) stockpile of gold. Why Russia will arrest the ruble’s slide and keep pumping oil
And there is Russia’s energy relationship with the EU, particularly Germany. Putin showed his clout when he axed the South Stream pipeline and announced that he would run a pipeline through Turkey instead.

The cancellation barely lasted long enough to speak it before the EU caved and offered Putin what he needed to get South Stream back on line. Germany is never going to let Turkey be a gatekeeper of European energy security. With winter arriving, the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas will take center stage, and the union will become a stabilizing influence on Russia once again.

In short, while the current situation is not working in Russia’s favor, the country is far from down for the count. It will arrest the ruble’s slide and keep pumping oil. Its economy will contract but not crumble. The harsh reality is that American shale fields have much more to fear from plummeting oil prices than the Russians (or the Saudis), since their costs of production are much higher. Many US shale wells will become uneconomic if oil falls much further. And it they start shutting down, it’ll be disastrous for the American economy, since the growth of the shale industry has underpinned 100% of US economic growth for the past several years.

Those waving their arms about the ruble might do better to look at countries facing real currency crises, like oil dependent Venezuela and Nigeria, as well as Ukraine. That’s where the serious trouble is going to come.
The collapse in oil prices is just the opening salvo in a decades long conflict to control the world’s energy trade. To find out what the future holds, specifically how Vladimir Putin has positioned Russia to come roaring back by leveraging its immense natural resource wealth, click here to get your copy of Marin Katusa’s smash hit New York Times bestseller, The Colder War. Inside, you’ll discover how underestimating Putin will have dire consequences.

And you’ll also discover how dangerous the deepening alliance between China, Russia and the emerging markets is to the future of American prosperity. Click here to get your copy.



Get our latest FREE eBook "Understanding Options"....Just Click Here!


Wednesday, April 16, 2014

What’s the Frequency Zenith?

By Grant Williams


WARNING: This week’s Things That Make You Go Hmmm... is going to run a little longer than usual, I’m afraid, so if you have some time to kill, strap yourself in for the ride.

Yes. I have read it.


For the last couple of weeks those have been the five words I have used the most — by a country mile.

The second most used five word combination during that time has been “I know, what a tool.”

The subject to which the first group of words pertains is, of course, Michael Lewis’s new book, Flash Boys; and the second phrase refers to a certain president of a certain exchange, who made a complete fool of himself during the fierce media debate that has surrounded the book since it burst upon the public consciousness in the space of what ironically felt like a few nanoseconds. (The particular piece to which I refer has to be seen to be believed; but if you somehow missed it, you’ll have your chance. Stick around.)
Now, before we get started, let’s get a few things straight right off the BAT(s).

Firstly, I am an enormous fan of Michael Lewis’s work. I think he is an incredible storyteller with a gift for narrative worthy of a place alongside many modern greats. I have read each of his books and enjoyed them all tremendously. Michael has an ability to weave complex subject matter into a tapestry that can be understood and enjoyed by many who might otherwise find such material utterly incomprehensible.

Secondly, I am no expert in high-frequency trading, but I have had some experience of it in recent years; and I have spent some considerable time analyzing it from a business perspective, which has given me a reasonable understanding of its mechanics.

Thirdly, whilst I have limited direct experience of HFT, I DO have almost thirty years’ hands-on experience of equity, bond, and commodity markets in the US, UK, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, and Japan, as well as in another dozen or so countries across Asia Pacific; and having watched markets of all types move in strange ways for seemingly no reason until, a few moments later, the cause of the move revealed itself, I feel I have developed enough of an understanding about how the markets work and, perhaps more importantly, about the people who MAKE them work, to venture an opinion or two about the subjects raised by Michael Lewis in Flash Boys.

But before we get to the book that is on everybody’s Kindle, we’re going to turn to sport for a little lesson. Let’s go back in time to Game 6 of the American League Championship Series between the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees in 2004, and recall the actions of another “Flash Boy,” Alex Rodriguez, the Yankees’ star third baseman.

Now, at this point, I’m sure the thousands of non-baseball fans amongst you are tuning out in your droves; but in order to try to keep you engaged, let me also tell you a parallel story from the football (or “soccer,” if you must) 2002 World Cup in South Korea, a tale that features one of its brightest stars of that era, the Brazilian midfielder Rivaldo ... and some decidedly unsavory antics.

Let’s see how we get on with this whole parallel story thing, shall we? I know Michael Lewis would do a phenomenal job of weaving the two stories together. Me? I’m not so sure.....

Deep breath.

In 2002, Rivaldo Vitor Borba Ferreira was a footballer at the very top of the world game. He had helped Brazil reach the final of the 1998 World Cup (where they lost to France), and four years later he was one-third of the renowned “Three Rs,” alongside Ronaldo and Ronaldinho (sadly NOT referred to as “the Two Ronnies”), who spearheaded the dynamic Brazilian team that was rightly installed as the prohibitive favourite to win the trophy that year.
In Brazil’s opening game against Turkey on June 3rd, Rivaldo scored a goal in the 87th minute to give Brazil a 2-1 lead with only three minutes to play, and was on his way to earning the Man of the Match award (think “MVP,” baseball fans). With seconds of added time left, Brazil won a corner, which Rivaldo wandered across the pitch to take at a pace which could, at best, be described as “lacking a degree of urgency.” The ball was at the feet of Turkish defender Hakan Ünsal, who most certainly WAS in a hurry.....

(Cue Michael Lewis-like change of scene to increase the dramatic tension.)

Game 6 of the 2004 ALCS, played at Yankee Stadium on October 19, 2004, had urgency to spare, as the Boston Red Sox, having lost the first three games of the series to their hated rivals from New York, needed a win to tie the series at 3 games each and force a Game 7 decider, which would be played at The Stadium the following night. One more loss and their season was over. (No team had ever come from 3 games down to take a Championship Series.)

The Yankees were led by their talismanic third baseman, Alex Rodriguez, who had almost joined the Red Sox earlier that year after the team had suffered a heart-breaking Game 7 loss in the 2003 ALCS — to whom else but the Yankees — only to have the deal voided at the last minute by the players’ union, a move which opened the door for the Yankees to steal the highest-paid and, at the time, most prolific player in the game from under the noses of the seemingly cursed Red Sox. (You can see how that whole situation played out in the excellent ESPN short documentary The Deal).

Rodriguez had been on a tear in 2004 and would end the season with 36 home runs, 106 RBIs, 112 runs scored, and 28 stolen bases. (Soccer fans, I’d give you a comparison, but there isn’t one. Think: doing everything. Really well.) This made Rodriguez only the third player in the 100+ years of baseball history to compile at least 35 home runs, 100 RBIs, and 100 runs scored in seven consecutive seasons (joining two other players with names that even soccer fans would know [kinda]: Babe Ruth and Jimmie Foxx). (No, NOT the actor who won an Oscar for Ray, soccer fans.)

During the playoffs, Rodriguez had dominated the Minnesota Twins, batting .421 with a slugging percentage of .737. (Soccer fans, let’s face it, baseball owns statistics. You got nuthin’. Nuthin’. Take it from me, Rodriguez was Messi with a bat.) He had also equaled the single game post season record by scoring five runs in Game 3 as the Yankees seized a 3-0 lead.

But in Game 6, Messi with a bat was about to get messy with at-bats as his form deserted him and he found himself at the plate in the 8th inning, facing Red Sox relief pitcher Bronson Arroyo, in the game for starting pitcher Curt Schilling, who had battled heroically through seven innings with a torn tendon sheath in his right ankle.

With the Yankees down 4-2 and team captain Derek Jeter on first base, Rodriguez represented the tying run......

On that steamy night two years prior, in a purpose-built stadium in Korea, Rivaldo stood by the corner flag, hands on his knees, waiting oh so patiently for the clock to run down Ünsal to pass the ball to him. The fans whistled their derision at the Brazilian’s delaying tactics. Sadly, time wasting in such situations is commonplace in football, and though the referees are obliged to add additional seconds to negate these tactics, they seldom do so effectively.

Ünsal was no doubt frustrated at the Brazilian’s gamesmanship and kicked the ball towards him at some pace in an attempt to speed things up.

Rivaldo flinched and tried to turn away from the incoming ball, which struck him roughly two inches above his right knee.

With the linesman (baseball fans, think: third base umpire) standing no more than two or three feet from the Brazilian, Rivaldo collapsed to the ground, clutching hisface as if he had pole axed by the incoming projectile, and writhing around as if every bone in his face had been shattered by the evil Turk.

To the astonishment of everybody in the stands, commentators from over a hundred countries, hundreds of millions of fans around the world, and, above all, Ünsal himself, the Turkish player was shown a red card and sent off (baseball fans, think: ejected) for his “crime.”

Rivaldo, having made a miraculous recovery, took the resulting corner, and Brazil held on against the ten men of Turkey for the victory.

Back in the Bronx, with the count at 2-2 (soccer fans, that’s two balls and two strikes, which means... oh, to hell with it. Baseball is so much trickier to explain. From here on in, you’re on your own), Alex Rodriguez swung his bat, made contact with Arroyo’s pitch, and sent it bobbling down the first-base line. As soon as he hit it, Rodriguez set off in a furious foot race that he had absolutely no chance of winning as he tried to beat the ball to first base. He knew it. We knew it.

Sure enough, Arroyo, with a head start, got to the ball first and took the two or three steps necessary to tag the Yankee with the ball (before he reached first base, which would render him “out” and send him back to the dugout, bringing the Yankee inning closer to an end).

However, as he reached out to tag Rodriguez, the ball spun loose from Arroyo’s glove and bobbled into right field, keeping the play alive and letting Jeter score from second and throw the Yankees a lifeline.

Rodriguez continued to second base, where he stopped, called time out, clapped his hands, and whooped.
Cue pandemonium.

Everybody in the stadium — except the first-base umpire ... and presumably the millions at home — had seen Rodriguez intentionally slap the ball from Arroyo’s glove, a move which in baseball parlance is known as “cheating.” (Soccer fans, think: cheating.)

After a strong protest from Red Sox manager Terry Francona and a lengthy consultation among the various umpires, justice was done. Rodriguez was called “out,” Jeter was returned to second base, and the score remained 4-2.

The Red Sox would go on to win the game and, the following night, become the first team in baseball history to win a series after losing the first three games. They would go on to defeat the St. Louis Cardinals 4-0 in the 100th World Series (soccer fans, think: national championship with no “world” connotation whatsoever) and to vanquish a famous “curse” that had persisted for 86 years.

Now, armed with that background, watch these two defining moments HERE and HERE.
In the aftermath, both players were defiant. Rivaldo, amazingly, tried to paint himself as the victim:

(BBC): Rivaldo had admitted fooling the referee by clutching his face after Ünsal kicked the ball at his leg while he was waiting to take a corner in the closing moments of the Group C match.

But he shrugged off the fine and defended his faking as part and parcel of the game.

The 30-year-old said: “I’m calm about the punishment.

“I am not sorry about anything.
“I was both the victim and the person who got fined.
“Obviously the ball didn’t hit me in the face, but I was still the victim. I did not hit anyone in the face.”

... whilst Rodriguez was, for some reason, “perplexed”:
(NY Times): Alex Rodriguez was standing on second base when the umpires decided that he did not belong there. He folded his hands atop his helmet and screamed, “What?’’
He was, to use his word, perplexed.

After the game, Yankees Manager Joe Torre demonstrated that, when it comes to seeing important plays that go against your team, there is one thing common to both soccer AND baseball: the unreliability of a manager’s eyesight. These guys see EVERYTHING that goes against their team perfectly but somehow always seem to be curiously oblivious when the shoe is on the other foot:

(NY Times): “Randy Marsh was closer than anyone else, and it looked like there were bodies all over the place,’’ Torre said, referring to the fact that first baseman Doug Mientkiewicz was near the play. “There were a lot of bodies in front of me, so I can’t tell you what I saw. I was upset it turned out the way it did for a couple of reasons.”

Presumably neither of those reasons involved the fact that the call was right.

Anyway, the point of these two stories as they pertain to Flash Boys is this:

Both Rodriguez and Rivaldo knew there were dozens of TV cameras on them. They knew there were millions of pairs of eyes on them around the world, and they knew that they were being watched by officials charged with monitoring the games to ensure fairness and punish malfeasance — and yet, knowing all that to be true, they both instinctively cheated to try to gain an edge.

That is how they, as competitors, are wired. Whether it’s right or wrong is irrelevant. (It’s wrong, in case you were wondering.) They were both given a set of rules within which to play, and both chose to step outside those rules in the hope that they would get away with it.

Rivaldo did, Rodriguez didn’t.

It’s a fine line, but the reward for success — even if it does involve bending the rules — is considerable.
Lewis’s media blitz began on Sunday night with an appearance on 60 Minutes, and in answering a simple opening question with a typically florid response, he sparked a media storm the likes of which I haven’t seen in a long, long time.

Steve Kroft: What’s the headline here?
Michael Lewis: Stock market’s rigged. The United States stock market, the most iconic market in global capitalism, is rigged.

Those words sent financial anchors on CNBC and Bloomberg TV into a state of apoplexy at the mere suggestion that the playing field in financial markets is anything but scrupulously fair.

As I watched the circus unpack its tents, erect them, and send a parade of clowns careening into the ring, I was genuinely baffled at what I was seeing.

The first act was Bill O’Brien, the president of BATS (one of the exchanges which, according to Lewis’s book, offers an unfair advantage to high-frequency traders), going toe-to-toe on CNBC with the hero of the book, Brad Katsuyama, once of RBC and now the founder of IEX, an exchange dedicated to leveling the playing field for the average investor.

Until last Sunday, I had never heard of either man, nor had I ever seen them in action.

What followed was extraordinary.

If you haven’t seen the clip, you can (and should) watch it HERE, because excerpts from a transcript cannot do justice to either the defensiveness of O’Brien or the cool confidence of Katsuyama; but from the off, had it been a fight, it would have been stopped before one of the participants embarrassed himself any further:


(CNBC):O’Brien: I have been shaking my head a lot the last 36 hours. First thing I would say, Michael and Brad, shame on both of you for falsely accusing literally thousands of people and possibly scaring millions of investors in an effort to promote a business model.

Bob Pisani (to Katsuyama): You are very respected on the street. I have known you a little while. You are thought very highly of. Do you think the markets are rigged?

Katsuyama (calmly): I think it’s very hard to put a word on it...

O’Brien (animatedly): He said it in the book. You said it in the book. “That’s when I knew the markets were rigged.” It’s disgusting that you are trying to parse your words now. Okay?

Katsuyama (calmly): Let me walk you through an example...
O’Brien: It’s a yes or no question. Do you believe it or not?
Katsuyama (calmly): I believe the markets are rigged.
O’Brien (somewhat triumphantly): Okay. There you go.
Katsuyama (calmly): I also think that you are part of the rigging. If you want to do this, let’s do this.

From there, Katsuyama proceeded to ask O’Brien how his own exchange (the one he, O’Brien, is president of) prices trades:

O’Brien: We use the direct feeds and the SIP (Securities Information Processor) in combination.
Katsuyama: I asked a question. Not what you use to route. What do you use to price trades in your matching engine on Direct Edge?
O’Brien: We use direct feeds.
Katsuyama: No.
O’Brien: Yes, we do...
Katsuyama: You use the SIP.
O’Brien: That is not true.

From there, O’Brien made the most successful attempt to make himself look a fool that I think I have ever seen (and on CNBC, that’s saying something). It was, I thought, painfully embarrassing to watch.
In my head, all I could hear was Sir Winston Churchill’s booming voice:

“Never engage in a battle of wits with an unarmed man.”

Less than 24 hours later...

(Wall Street Journal): BATS Global Markets Inc., under pressure from the New York Attorney General’s office, corrected statements made by a senior executive during a televised interview this week about how its exchanges work.

BATS President William O’Brien, during a CNBC interview Tuesday, said BATS’s Direct Edge exchanges use high-speed data feeds to price stock trades. Thursday, the exchange operator said two of its exchanges, EDGA and EGX, use a slower feed, known as the Securities Information Processor, to price trades.

Viva El Presidente!

Anyway, the interesting thing to me, once I got past the sheer insanity of it all, was the level of amazement shown by the CNBC journalists that the market could possibly be “rigged” in any way, shape, or form.
That amazement was shared by the two anchors on Bloomberg’s Market Makers show, Stephanie Ruhle and Eric Schatzker, when their turn came to take a tilt at Lewis the following day:

Ruhle (bewildered): The market is rigged? That’s a big claim!
Lewis (even more bewildered): Well it IS rigged. If you read the book, I don’t think you’d put it down and say the market’s not rigged.

Then, after a pretty good casino analogy that was interrupted by the anchors a few times, Lewis got to the crux of the issue that had been bothering me as I watched:

Lewis: Why are you so invested in the idea this is fair? Why are you even arguing about this? It’s so clear... people are front-running the market. There’s plenty of evidence in the book.
Schatzker: Their orders are being “anticipated.”

Lewis (laughing at the escalating absurdity): Anticipated and run in front of.... [The HFTs] PAY to execute the orders. Tens of millions of dollars a year. Ask yourself THAT question. Why would ANYONE pay for the right to execute someone else’s stock market order?... It’s quite obvious. That order is an opportunity to exploit, because he has advance information about the pricing in the stock market. Is that “fair”?

Ruhle: Today, when I go to execute a stock, I feel like, man, how did that get jacked right in front of me, every time? I do feel that way. But fifteen years ago when I did a trade, I was paying significantly more to do it through a specialist because of what the fees were.... Is it a different situation than when specialists were on the floor?

Lewis (with a somewhat confused look on his face): I never said THAT.
Ruhle: So has the system ALWAYS been rigged?
Lewis: Yes.

Yes.

After watching these exchanges, I was so astounded that so many people could STILL live in a complete fantasy world under the illusion assumption that the markets couldn’t possibly be rigged that I turned to my friends in the Twittersphere:


That was the 2,567th tweet I have sent out and, in contrast to the nearly pathological indifference shown by the rest of the world to the previous 2,566, this one was retweeted 96 times. (Button it, Bieber! That’s an impressive number for me, OK?)

But who are these people who believe in unicorns and rainbows fair markets?

Click here to continue reading this article from Things That Make You Go Hmmm… – a free weekly newsletter by Grant Williams, a highly respected financial expert and current portfolio and strategy advisor at Vulpes Investment Management in Singapore.


Get the "Real Wealth Income Generator" our Unusual Short Term Trading Technique


Wednesday, December 11, 2013

The Correction Isn’t Over, But Gold’s Headed to $20,000

By Louis James, Chief Metals & Mining Investment Strategist

In April of 2008, Casey International Speculator published an article called "Gold—Relative Performance to Oil" by Professor Krassimir Petrov, then at the American University in Bulgaria, now a visiting professor at Prince of Songkla University in Thailand. He told us he thought the Mania Phase of the gold market was many years off, which was not a popular thing to say at the time:

"In about 8-10 years from now, we should expect the commodity bull market to reach a mania of historic proportions.

"It is important to emphasize that the above projection is entirely mine. I base it on my own studies of historical episodes of manias, bubbles, and more generally of cyclical analysis. In fact, it contradicts many world renowned scholars in the field. For example, the highly regarded Frank Veneroso and Robert Prechter widely publicized their beliefs that during 2007 there was a commodity bubble; both of them called the collapse in commodity prices in mid-March of 2008 to be the bursting of the bubble. I strongly disagree with them.

"I also disagree with many highly sophisticated gold investors and with our own Doug Casey that the Mania stage, if there is one, will be in 2-3 years, and possibly even sooner... Although I disagree that we will see a mania in a couple years, I expect healthy returns for gold."

It turned out that Dr. Petrov was right. Five and a half years later, here's his current take on gold and the metal's ongoing correction…...

Louis James: So Krassimir, it's been a long and interesting five years since we last spoke… Gold bugs didn't like your answer then, but so far it seems that you were right. So what's your take on gold today?

Krassimir Petrov: Well, most gold bugs won't like my answer again, because I think we are still between six to ten years away from the peak of the gold bull. We are exactly in the middle of this secular bull market, and a secular bull market is usually punctuated or separated by a major cyclical bear market. I think that the ongoing 24-month correction is that typical big major cyclical correction—a cyclical bear market within the context of the secular bull market.

Thinking in terms of behavioral analysis, most investors are very, very bearish on gold. People who are not gold bugs overall still dismiss gold as a good or even as a legitimate investment. That, too, is typical of a mid-cycle. So as far as I'm concerned, we are somewhere in the middle of the cycle, which may easily go for another 10 years.

I expect that this secular bull market for gold will last a total of 20 to 25 years, dating back to its beginning in 2000. Some people like to date the beginning of this secular bull market at the cyclical bottom in 1999, while others date it at the cyclical bottom in 2001. I prefer to date it at 2000, so that the secular bottom for gold coincides with the secular top of the stock market in 2000.

L: That's interesting. But I'm not sure gold bugs would find this to be bad news. The thing they're afraid to hear is that the market has peaked already—that the $1,900 nominal price peak in 2011 was the top, and that it's downhill for the next two decades. To hear you say that there is a basis in more than one type of analysis for arguing that we're still in the middle of the bull cycle—and that it should go upwards over the next 10 years—that's actually quite welcome.

Petrov: Yes, it's great news. But we're still not going to get to the Mania Phase for at least another two, but more likely four to six years from now.

Now, we should clarify what we mean by the Mania Phase. Last time, it was the 1979 to early 1980 period. It's the last phase of the cycle when the price goes parabolic. Past cycles show that the Mania Phase is typically 10% or 15% of the total cycle. So it's important to pick the proper dates for defining a gold bull market. I prefer to date the previous one from 1966 as the beginning of the market, to January of 1980 as the top of the cycle. That means that the previous bull market lasted 14 years, and it's fair to say that the Mania Phase lasted about 18 months, or just under 15% of the cycle.

So I expect the Mania Phase for the current bull cycle to last about two to three years, and it's many years yet until we reach it.

In terms of market psychology, we still have many people who believe in real estate; we still have many people buying and believing in the safety of bonds; we still have many people who believe in stocks. All of these people still outright dismiss gold as a legitimate investment. So, to get to the Mania Phase, we need all of these people to convert to gold bull market thinking, and that's going to be six to eight years from now. No sooner.

L: Hm. Your analysis is a combination of what we might call the fundamentals and the technicals. Looking at the market today—

Petrov: Let's clarify. When I say fundamental analysis, I mean strictly relevant valuation ratios. For example, according to the valuation of gold relative to the stock market, i.e., the Dow/gold ratio, gold is extremely undervalued, easily by about 10 times, relative to the stock market.

Fundamental analysis can also mean the relative price of gold to real estate—the number of ounces necessary to buy a house. Looked at this way, gold is still roughly about 10 times undervalued.
Thus, fundamental analysis refers to the valuation of gold relative to the other asset classes (stocks, bonds, real estate, and currencies), and each of these analyses suggests that gold is undervalued about 10 times.
In terms of portfolio analysis, gold today is probably about one percent of an average investor's portfolio.

L: Right; it's underrepresented. But before we go there, while we are defining things, can you define how you look at these time periods? Most people would say that the last great bull market of the 1970s began in 1971, when Richard Nixon closed the gold window, not back in 1966, when the price of gold was fixed. Can you explain that to us, please?

Petrov: Well, first of all, we had the London Gold Pool, established in 1961 to maintain the price of gold stable at $35. But just because the price was fixed legally and maintained by the pool at $35 doesn't mean that there was no underlying bull market. The mere fact that the London Gold Pool was manipulating gold in the late 1960s, before the pool collapsed in 1968, should tell us for sure that we already had an incipient, ongoing secular bull market.

The other argument is that while the London Gold Pool price was fixed at $35, there were freely traded markets in gold outside the participating countries, and the market price at that moment was steadily rising. So, around 1968 we had a two-tiered gold market: the fixed government price at $35 and the free-market price—and these two prices were diverging, with the free price moving steadily higher and higher.

L: Do you have data on that? I never thought about it, but surely the gold souks and other markets must have been going nuts before Nixon took the dollar completely off the gold standard.

Petrov: Yes. There have been and still are many gold markets in the Arab world, and there have been many gold markets in Europe, including Switzerland. Free-market prices were ranging significantly higher than the fixed price: up to 10, 20, or 30% premiums.

There's also a completely different way to think about it: in order to time gold secular bull and bear markets properly, it would make the most sense that they would be the inverse of stock market secular bull and bear markets. Thus, a secular bottom for gold should coincide with the secular top for stocks. And based on the work of many stock market analysts, it is generally accepted that the secular bear market in stocks began in 1966 and ended in 1980 to 1982. This again suggests to me that it would make a lot of sense to use 1966 for dating the beginning of the gold bull market.

L: Understood. On this subject of dating markets, what is it that makes you think this one's going to be a 25-year cycle? That's substantially longer than the last one. We have a different world today, sure, but can you explain why you think this cycle will be that long?

Petrov: Well, based on all the types of analyses I use—cyclical analysis, behavioral analysis, portfolio analysis, fundamental analysis, and technical analysis—this bull market is developing a lot slower, so it will take a lot longer.

The correction from 1973 to 1975 was the major cyclical correction of the last gold bull cycle, from roughly $200 down to roughly $100. Back then, it took from 1966 to 1973—about six to seven  years—for the correction to begin. This time, it took roughly 11 years to begin, so I think the length of this cycle could be anywhere between 50 and 60% longer than the last one.

Let's clarify this, because it's very important for gold bulls who are suffering through the pain of correction now. If we are facing a 50-60% extended time frame of this cycle and the major correction in the previous bull market was roughly two years, we could easily have the ongoing correction last 30 to 35 months. Given the starting point in 2011, the correction could last another six, eight, or ten more months before we hit rock bottom.

L: Another six to ten months before this correction hits bottom is definitely not what gold investors want to hear.

Petrov: I'm not saying that I expect it, but another six to ten months should not surprise us at all. A lot of people jumped on the gold bull market in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and these people haven't given up yet. Behaviorally, we expect that these latecomers—maybe 80-90% of them—should and would give up on gold and sell before the new cyclical bull resumes.

L: Whoa—now that would be a bloodbath. Can we go back to your version of fundamental analysis for a moment and compare gold to other metrics? You mentioned that gold is still relatively undervalued in terms of houses and stocks and some things, but I've heard from other analysts that it's relatively high compared to other things—loaves of bread, oil, and more.

Petrov: Let's take oil, for example. We have a very stable long-term ratio between oil and silver, and that ratio is roughly one to one. For a long time, silver was about $1.20, and oil was roughly $1.20. At the peak in 1980, silver was about $45, and oil was about $45. Right now, silver is four to five times undervalued compared to oil, so in terms of oil, I would disagree for silver. The long-term ratio of gold to oil is about 15 to 20, depending on the time frame, so gold may not be cheap, but it's not overvalued relative to oil either.
But suppose gold were overvalued relative to other commodities—which I doubt, but even if we suppose that it's correct, it simply doesn't mean that gold is generally overvalued. The other commodities could be even more—meaning 10, 15, 20 times—undervalued relative to the stock market, or real estate, or bonds.

There is no contradiction. In fundamental analysis, it is illegitimate to compare gold, which is largely viewed as a commodity, to other commodities. We should compare it as one asset class against other asset classes.
For example, we could compare gold relative to real estate. By this measure, it is easily five to ten times undervalued. Separately, we could evaluate it relative to stocks. When you compare gold to stocks in terms of the Dow/gold ratio, it's easily five to ten times undervalued. Separately again, we could evaluate it relative to bonds, but the valuation is much more complicated, because we need to impute a proper inflation-adjusted long-term yield, so it's better not to get into this now. And finally, we could evaluate it separately against currencies. More on that later.

Now, I believe that when this cycle is over, we are going to reach a Dow/gold ratio far lower than in previous cycles, which have ended with a Dow/gold ratio of about 2:1 (two ounces of gold for one unit of Dow). This time, we are going to end up with a ratio of 1:2—one ounce of gold is going to buy two units of Dow. So, if the ratio right now is about 8:1, I think gold could go up 16 times relative to the stock market today.

L: That's quite a statement. Government intervention today is so extreme and stocks in general seem so overvalued, I can believe the Dow/gold ratio could reach a new extreme—but I have to follow up on such an aggressive statement. What do you base that on? Why do you think it will go to 1:2 instead of 2:1?

Petrov: If I remember correctly, we had a 2:1 ratio during the first bottom in 1932; the Dow Jones bottomed out at $42 and gold was roughly about $20 before Roosevelt devalued the dollar. That was also the beginning of the so-called "paper world," when we embarked on the current paper cycle.

The next cycle bottomed in 1980; gold was roughly 850 and the stock market was roughly 850, yielding a ratio of 1:1. Now, if we look at it in terms of the "paper" supercycle, beginning in the early 20th century and extending to the early 21st century, you can draw a technical line of support levels for the Dow/gold ratio. If you do this, you end up with Dow/gold bottoming at 2:1 (in 1932), then at 1:1 (in 1980), and you can project the next one to bottom at 1:2.

Another way to think about it is that we are currently in a so-called supercycle—whether it's a gold supercycle or a commodity supercycle—and this supercycle should last 50 to 70% longer than the previous one. It will overcorrect for the whole period of paper money over the last 80 years.

From a behavioral perspective, I could easily see people overreacting; we could easily see that at the peak we're going to have a major panic with overshooting. I expect the overshooting to be roughly proportional to the length of the whole corrective process.

In other words, if this cycle is extended in time frame, we would expect the overshooting of the Mania Phase to be significantly larger. It should be no surprise, then, if we get a ratio of 1:1.5 or 1:2, with gold valued more than the Dow.

L: That's a scary world you're describing, but the argument makes sense. How many cycles do you have to base your cyclical analysis on, to be able to say that the average Mania Phase is 15% of the cycle?

Petrov: Well, gold is the most complicated investment asset. It is half commodity, and it behaves as a commodity, but it's also half currency. It's the only asset that belongs in two asset classes, properly considered to be a financial asset (money) and at the same time a real asset (commodity). So, even though gold prices were fixed in the 20th century, you can get proper cycles for commodities over the time period and include gold in them. If you look into commodity cycles historically, there are four to five longer (AKA Kondratieff) commodity cycles you can use to infer what the behavior for gold as a commodity might be.

L: So would it be fair, then, to characterize your projections as saying, "As long as gold is treated by investors as a commodity, then these are the time frames and the projections we can make"?

Petrov: Right.

L: But if at some point the world really goes off the deep end and the money aspect of gold comes to the forefront—if people completely lose confidence in the US dollar, for example—at that point, the fact that gold is a commodity would not be the main driver. The monetary aspect of gold would take over?

Petrov: No, not exactly, because you will still have a commodity cycle. You will still have oil moving up. Rice will still be moving up, as will wheat, all the other commodities pushing higher and higher, and they will pull gold.

Yet another important tangent here is that in commodity bull markets, gold is usually lagging in the early stages. In the late stages of a commodity bull market, as gold becomes perceived to be an inflation hedge, it begins to accelerate relative to other commodities. This is yet another very good indicator that tells me that we are still in the middle of a secular bull market in gold. In other words, because gold is not yet rapidly outstripping other commodities like wheat, or copper, or crude oil, we're not yet in the late stages of the gold bull market.

L: That's very interesting. But if I remember the gold chart over the last great bull market correctly, just before the 1973-1976 correction, there was quite an acceleration, such as you're describing—and we had one like it in 2011. Gold shot up $300 in the weeks before the $1,900 peak.

Petrov: Absolutely correct. This acceleration before the correction is exactly what tells me that the correction we're in now is a major cyclical correction, just like in the mid-1970s. The faster the preceding acceleration, the longer the ensuing correction. This relationship is what tells me that this correction will be very long and painful. Yet another indicator. Everything fits in perfectly. All of these indicators confirm each other.

L: Could you imagine something from the political world changing or accelerating this cycle? If the politicians in Washington are stupid enough to profoundly shake the faith in the US dollar that foreigners have, could that not change the cycle?

Petrov: Yes, that's a possibility. This is exactly what a gray swan is; a gray swan is an event that is not very likely, that is difficult to predict, but is nonetheless possible to predict and expect. One example of a gray swan would be a nuclear war. It's possible. Another could be a major currency war, à la Jim Rickards. There are a number of gray swans that could come at any time, any place, accelerating the cycle. It's perfectly possible, but not likely.

Now, going back to your question about monetizing or remonetizing gold—the monetary aspect of gold taking over that you mentioned. The remonetization of gold wouldn't short-circuit the commodity cycle; the commodity cycle would continue. Actually, you'd expect the remonetization of gold to go hand in hand with a commodity bull market.

You also need to understand that the remonetization of gold would not be a single event, not a point in time. Remonetization of gold is a process that could easily last five to ten years. No one is going to declare gold to be the monetary currency of the world tomorrow.

What will happen is that countries like China will accumulate gold over time. Over time, gold will be revalued significantly higher, and there will be global arrangements. The yuan will become a global currency, used in international transactions. Many institutional arrangements need to be in place around the world, including storage, payments, settlements, and some rebalancing between central banks, as some central banks have way too little monetary gold at the moment.

L: I agree, and see some of those things happening already. But I don't expect any government to lead the way to a new gold standard. I simply expect more and more people to start using gold as money, until what governments are left bow to the reality. I believe the market will choose whatever works best for money.

Petrov: Indeed, and that's a process that will take many years. Getting back to gold in a portfolio context, relative to currencies, gold is extremely cheap. Historically, gold will constitute about 10-15% of the global investment portfolio relative to the sum of real estate, stocks, bonds, and currencies. Estimates suggest that right now gold is valued at roughly about one percent of the global investment portfolio.

L: That implies… an enormous price for gold if it reverts to the mean. Mine production is such a tiny amount of supply; the only way for what you say to come true is for gold to go to something on the order of $20,000 an ounce.

Petrov: Correct. $15,000 to $20,000. That's exactly what I'm saying. In a portfolio context, gold is undervalued easily 10 to 15 times. On a fundamental basis, gold is undervalued relative to stocks 10 to 15 times, and relative to real estate about 10 times. When we use the different types of analyses, each one of them separately and independently tells us that we still have a lot longer to go: about six to 10 more years; maybe even 12 years. And we still have a lot higher to rise; maybe 10-15 times.

Not relative to oil, nor wheat, but gold can easily rise 10 to 15 times in fiat-dollar terms. It can rise 10 times in, let's say, stock market terms. And yes, it can go 10 to 15 times relative to long-term bonds. (We have to differentiate short-term bonds and long-term bonds, as bond yields rise to 10 or 15 percent.)

So, portfolio analysis and fundamental analysis tell me that we still have a long way to go, and cyclical analysis tells me we are roughly mid-cycle. It tells me that from the beginning of the cycle (2000) to the correction (2011) we were up almost eight times, from the bottom of the current correction (2013-2014) to the peak in another six to ten years, we are still going to rise another 10 times.

Whether it's eight years or 12, it's impossible to predict; whether it's eight times or 12, again, impossible to predict; but the order of magnitude will be around 10 times current levels.

L: You've touched on technical analysis: do you rely on it much?

Petrov: Well, yes, but in this particular case, technical subsumes or incorporates a great deal of cyclical analysis. It's very difficult to use technical analysis for secular cycles. We usually use technical analysis for daily (short-term) cycles, or weekly (intermediate) cycles, or monthly (long-term) cycles. We use them as described in the classic book Technical Analysis of Stock Market Trends by Edwards, Magee, and Bassetti.

If we apply technical analysis to our current correction, it doesn't appear to be quite over yet. It could still run another three to six months, possibly nine months. But when we talk about the secular cycle, we need to switch from technical to long-term cyclical analysis.

L: Okay. Let's change topic to the flip side of this. Can you summarize your view of the global economy now? Do you believe that the efforts of the governments of the world to reflate the economy are succeeding? Or how does the big picture look to you?

Petrov: The big picture is an austere picture. Reflation will always succeed until it eventually fails. The way I see it, the US is going down, down, and down from here—the US is a very easy forecast. The UK is also going down, down, and down from here—another easy forecast. The European Union is going to be going mostly down. However, most of Asia is in bubble mode. Australia is in a major bubble that's in the process of bursting or is about to do so; it's going to go through a major depression. China is a huge bubble, so China will get its own Great Depression, which could last five to ten years. This five- to ten-year China bust would fit within my overall 10-year forecast for the remainder of the secular bull market in gold.

I see a lot of very inflated and overheating Asian economies. I was in Hong Kong in January, and the Hong Kong economy is booming to the point of overheating. It's crazy. I was in Singapore just three months ago, and the Singapore economy is clearly overheating. Last year I was teaching in Macao for a few months, and the economy is overheating there as well—real estate is crazy; rents are obscene; five-star hotels are full and casinos crowded.

Right now I'm teaching in Thailand. It's easy here to see that people are still crazy about real estate—everyone's talking about real estate; we still have a peaking real estate bubble here. Consumption is going crazy in the whole society, and most things are bought on installment credit.

Another easy forecast is Japan; it too will be going down, down, and down from here. Japan has nowhere to go but down. It's been reflating and reflating, and it hasn't done them any good. Add all this up and what I actually see is a repeat of the 1997 Asian Crisis, involving most Asian countries.

L: So your overall view is that reflation works until it doesn't, and you believe that on the global scale we're at the point where it won't work anymore?

Petrov: Not exactly. We're at the point where reflation doesn't work anymore for the US, no matter how hard it tries. It doesn't work for the UK; not for most of Europe; not for Japan—no matter how hard they try. But reflation is still working in China. Reflation is still working for most of Asia and Australia. As I see it, Asia is overheating significantly, based on that global reflation.

Even the Philippines was overheating when I was there two years ago. Malaysia is overheating big time—consumerism at its finest—and I'm hearing stories about Indonesia overheating until recently as well. Maybe we have the first sounds of that bubble bursting in countries like India, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The Indian currency is weakening significantly; so is the Malaysian currency. If I remember correctly, the Indonesian currency is weakening significantly, and I know well that their money market rates are skyrocketing in the last few months.

So we may have now the beginning of the next Asian Financial Crisis. Asia is still going to be able to reflate a little longer, another year or two, maybe three. It's very hard to say how long a bubble will last as it is inflating. The same thing for Australia; it will continue to reflate for a few more years. So for Asia and Australia, we are not yet at the point when reflation will no longer work. Very difficult to say when that will change, but we're there for the US, UK, Europe, and Japan.

L: Why won't reflation work for the U.S. and its pals?

Petrov: Reflation doesn't work because of the enormous accumulated economic distortions of the real sector and the labor market. All the dislocations, all the malinvestments have accumulated to the point where reflation has diminishing returns.  Like everything else, inflation and reflation have diminishing returns. The US now needs maybe three, four, or five trillion annually to reflate, in order to work. With each round, the need rises exponentially. The US is on the steep end of this exponential curve, so the amount needed to reflate the economy is probably way more than the tolerance of anyone around the world—confidence in the US dollar won't take it. The US is at the point where it is just not going to work.

L: I understand; if they're running trillion dollar deficits now and the economy is still sluggish, what would they have to do to get it hopping again, and is that even possible?

Petrov: Correct. The Fed has tripled its balance sheet in a matter of three to four years—and it still doesn't work. So what can they do? Increase it 10 times? Or 20 times? Maybe if they increased it 10 or 20 times, they could breathe another one or two or three years of extra life into the economy. But increasing the Fed's balance sheet 10 or 20 times would be an extraordinarily risky enterprise. I don't think that they will dare accelerate that much that fast!

L: If they did, it would trash the dollar and boost gold and other commodities.

Petrov: Yes, that's clear—the bond and the currency markets would surely revolt. That's a straight shot there. The detailed ramifications for commodities, if they decide to go exponential from here, are a huge subject for another day. For now, we can say that they have been going exponential over the last three to four years, and it hasn't worked.

Also, we know well from the hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic that they went exponential early on, and it stopped working in 1921. For two more years, they went insanely exponential, and it still didn't work. I think the US is at or near the equivalent of 1921 for Weimar.

L: An alarming thought. So what happens when Europeans can no longer afford to pay the Russians for gas to heat their homes? Large chunks of Europe might soon need to learn Russian.

Petrov: Not necessarily, but Europe is going to become Russia's best friend and geopolitical ally. The six countries in the Shanghai Co-op are already close allies of Russia. So is Iran. So Russia has seven or eight very strong, close allies. European countries will, one by one, be joining Russia. Think about it from the point of view of Germany: why should Germans be geopolitical allies of the US or the UK? Historically, it doesn't make any sense. It makes a lot more sense for them to join the Russians and the Chinese and to let the Americans and British collapse. So that's what I expect, and Russia will use all its energy to dictate geopolitics to them.

L: Food for thought. Anything else on your mind that you think investors should be thinking about?

Petrov: Well, it's fairly straightforward. First, I do expect that the stock market is going to lose significant value over the next five to ten years. Second, I believe that real estate is still grossly overvalued; as interest rates eventually rise, real estate will fall hard—overall, it will not hold value well. Third, I also believe that bonds are extremely overvalued and that yields are extremely low. I expect interest rates to begin to rise and bond prices to fall, so I strongly discourage investors from staying in bonds. Finally, I expect that governments will continue to inflate, even though it doesn't work, and that currencies will devalue.

I strongly encourage investors to stay out of all four of these asset classes. Investors should be staying well diversified in commodities. They shouldn't ignore food—agriculture. They shouldn't ignore energy. But their portfolios should be dominated by precious metals.

L: That's what Doug Casey says, and that the reason to own gold is for prudence. To speculate for profit, we want the leverage only the mining stocks can give us.
Thank you very much, Krassimir; it's been a very interesting conversation. We shouldn't let this go another seven years before we talk again.

Petrov: [Laughs] Okay. Hopefully a lot sooner. Hopefully you'll be prepared when the gold bull market reaches the Mania Phase… and hopefully you are taking advantage of the low gold price to stack up on your "hard money" safety net.

Find out the best ways to invest in gold, when to buy, and what to watch for—in Casey's 2014 Gold Investor's Guide. Click here to get your free special report now.


Get our "Gold and Crude Oil Trade Ideas"


Tuesday, October 15, 2013

Busting Economic and Natural Resource Myths

By The Gold Report

The Gold Report: Why is the theory of tapering or turning quantitative easing (QE) off a myth, and who really benefits from QE?


Rick Rule: My view—as an investor, not an economist—is that QE is misnamed. I think it's another way of saying counterfeiting. It exists in large measure because we're running a trillion-dollar deficit and, while we can hoodwink investors into funding two-thirds of it, we need to print away the last third.

TGR: What are the consequences of turning off QE?

Louis James: Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said himself that he had certain criteria he wanted to see before tapering—employment in particular. Those have not been met. Employment figures have improved, but only in—I guess the technical term would be "crappy" jobs. Long-term employment, the middle class' bread and butter, is not better.

TGR: Rick, you defy common sense and argue that bull markets are bad and bear markets are good, but it doesn't feel that way.

RR: JT, at the risk of being sexist, women are normally more rational shoppers than men. Think about the stock market as a mall.

In the mall, the store on the left-hand of the entrance has a big flashing sign that says, "Bear Market Merchants All Goods 70% Off, No Reasonable Offer Refused, Come Back Tomorrow—Prices May Be Lower." The store on the right-hand side has a tiny sign that says, "Bespoke Bear Market Merchants, No Deals Ever, High Margin for Merchants, Don't Even Think About Asking for a Deal, Prices May Be Higher Next Week."

If you're going to buy a pair of shoes, which store would you go to? This is a no-brainer. When people buy physical goods, they act rationally. When they buy financial goods, they want to overpay. It's totally irrational, and it's extraordinarily common. If you want to become wealthier, why wouldn't you buy financial assets when they're on sale?

TGR: Staying with the mall analogy, does that suggest that people are afraid stocks will be on even deeper sale tomorrow?

Marin Katusa: You have to look at the timeframe. This is a great market if you're an accredited investor and have an account with someone like Rick Rule or you subscribe to the International Speculator and follow the right management teams. Today, you can invest in deals with five-year full warrants that would not have been available three years ago. Rick and I have been in meetings where the venture teams laughed at me when I requested full warrants. Rick just said, "Bite your lip, smile, and wait." And he was right.
If you're buying stock today in hopes that the market will go up the next day, you'll be in a lot of pain. But if you have a two- to five-year timeframe, you can get guys like Bob Quartermain and Lukas Lundin on sale.

LJ: What would you give to go back in time and buy Apple just after the Apple II came out? Or to buy Microsoft when DOS was new?

Over the course of the last decade—what I think of as the first half of this great bull cycle—billions of dollars have gone into the ground and done good work.

Companies with 10 million ounces of high grade gold in a safe mining jurisdiction are on sale below IPO prices. Some companies with excellent management and assets in hand are selling for less than cash value. You can buy these companies now, instead of looking for the next Apple or Microsoft.

RR: Words like "want" and "hope" in speculation are truly four-letter words, profanities. Having a stock in your portfolio that cost $200,000 and has a current market valuation of $40,000 is unfortunate, but irrelevant. Investors need to take advantage of their education and do their best with the situation at hand. Right now, things are cheap. When things are cheap you're supposed to buy. In bull markets, when things are expensive, you're supposed to sell.

Right now, buying is easy because you have no competitors. In a bull market, selling is easy because everybody is a buyer. If the market is desperately looking for bids and you are scared to death because your stocks can't catch bids, you have to bid. They say the market was desperate for asks, but this market is desperate for bids.

TGR: Some have said this the end of the commodity supercycle. Is that a myth? And is it more or less of a myth in some sectors than others?

RR: The narrative that existed in 2009-2010, when the commodity supercycle was the currency of all financial thinking, is unchanged. The first part of that narrative was founded on the idea that world population growth was taking commodity consumption higher. World population growth is not over.

The second part of the narrative was that as poor people gained more freedom, they got richer and consumed more. Political liberalization in emerging frontier markets has continued, and people are wealthier and are consuming more.

A third part of the narrative was that Western consumers had lived beyond their means and as a consequence were debasing the denominators, the fiat currencies. If you debase the denominator, the nominal value of stuff would go up. We have not stopped debasing the denominator.

The entire narrative associated with the resource-industry bull market is intact. Nothing has changed except the price. A cyclical decline in a secular bull market is a different way of describing a spectacular sale, for people who understand that the narrative hasn't changed.

TGR: Are there some sectors that still feel as if it's a commodity supercycle?

MK: Definitely. Look at oil.

RR: But your readers don't want to look for hot sectors, because they are overpriced. They want to look for cold sectors. They want to find the sector, management team, or the company that's going to be hot.

TGR: If oil is hot right now, what is going to be hot?

MK: From the energy side, I think within three years uranium will be hot.

TGR: Why the three-year timeline?

MK: There are three major catalysts. First is the end of the US-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement (HEU). The last shipment will happen at the end of 2013.

Second is the transitional agreement, in which the Russians will provide up to 50% of the uranium on a new pricing metric than the HEU agreement. Only this time, the Russians have new dance partners: Saudi Arabia, China, India, Korea, even France. The reality is the Americans will have to pay more for uranium from the Russians.

Third, nuclear reactors are not all being taken down; they're being built. Japan plans to bring its reactors back online, just not on the timeframe the junior resource sector wants them to. The Japanese cannot afford to pay the most expensive electricity prices in the world and stay competitive. They have no choice but to move forward with nuclear power.

TGR: Is the end of HEU already priced in to uranium?

MK: Yes, both because the market is determining what it's worth today and because Japan shut down 40 nuclear reactors. That's a black-swan game-changer that shifted everything.

Yet, the long-term price is 50% higher than the spot price, and more than 90% of the uranium being consumed and traded is based on the long-term price. That's the equivalent of saying gold today is $1,300/ounce, but if you want to take delivery in three or four years—which is what nuclear utilities do for uranium—you have to pay $1,900/oz. Or copper at $4.50/pound if you want delivery in five years. That's the situation in uranium today.

TGR: Louis, which sector are you looking forward to?

LJ: There's talk on the streets about helium, although I'm not sure I want to move in that direction. I'm happier focusing on something right in front of me and that I understand. Finding a company that has a multimillion-ounce, high-grade deposit and is on sale at half price is similar to going into the supermarket and finding the thickest, most beautifully marbled T-bone steak, fresh cut today, on sale for half off. Why bother with hamburger of unknown quality?

TGR: We keep hearing that we've hit a bottom, which would imply that the market is moving up. However, Rick, you have described it as a bifurcated market in which the bad stocks will continue to sink, which would be a good thing. How do we know which companies will sink and which will revive?

RR: That's a critical question. Before your readers classify stocks, they need to classify themselves. Are they the type of person who will put enough time and attention into securities analysis to compete on their own? Or do they need other people to help them compete?

While securities analysis and stock selection in the junior market is imperfect, it can be done. It requires understanding the stock. If you're not willing to understand the stock, you need an advisor.

TGR: How many hours does that work take? What questions should investors be asking?

RR: Speculators running their own portfolios without advice should limit the number of stocks in the portfolio to the number that they can spend two or three hours a month working on. That means reading every press release, proxy, quarterly, and annual report. Read the president's message and measure it against what he said the company would accomplish over the year.

Speculators unwilling to do that need to hire somebody who will. That may mean subscribing to one of the trading services offered by Casey or hiring an organization like Sprott to be a broker or a manager.
Getting to bifurcation and stock selection, if 15% of the stocks are moving higher, 85% are moving lower. You won't be able to concentrate 100% in either camp, but if you get more right than wrong, you'll make so much money that the outliers will be irrelevant. If you get it wrong, you'll lose so much money that you ought to be in some other business.

TGR: Are there fewer brokers walking the streets of Vancouver these days?

MK: Definitely, also fewer analysts and fewer corporate development positions and many fewer investor relations people.

There are more BMWs, Mercedes, and Ferraris on sale, and now more offices becoming vacant.

TGR: Does that mean only the best are left?

MK: Not necessarily.

RR: But it does reduce the population. To be a responsible analyst, you once had to look in a cursory fashion at 4,000 companies. Today, having only 3,000 companies to look at is an advantage.

The three of us look at data in a summary fashion to try and dispose of a company. You look for something to kill your interest. The good news is that the population of timewasters is down by at least a third. That's unfortunate for their shareholders, but that's their problem, not ours. Our job is to look after our subscribers or clients.

TGR: Let's talk about regions. Is it true that the Yukon is remote?

LJ: It's no more remote now than it was last year. You can't write off the Yukon or anywhere without looking at and understanding the specifics of individual opportunities. Miners with remote projects that have high enough margins are able to barge or truck diesel fuel in and run gen-sets, etc. If Canadians can mine diamonds in the Arctic Circle, they can mine gold in the Yukon.

Remoteness by itself is not the issue. The issue is margin. If you're in the Yukon and you've got something low grade, with low recoveries and complex metallurgy—don't call us, we'll call you. If you have something high grade, open pit, that leaches, tell me more.

TGR: Rick, in your presentation, you talked about platinum and palladium. Is that an area where the supercycle needs to whip things up?

RR: I don't think it even requires a supercycle. With platinum and palladium, I can look empirically at simple supply and demand. On a global basis, the platinum and palladium industry doesn't earn its cost of capital. That means one of two things will happen: The price of platinum and palladium will increase, or there won't be enough platinum and palladium to supply current demand.

In the context of supply, you don't have to worry about investor inventories because there are almost none. The world supply of existing, finished platinum and palladium is less than one year's fabrication demand.
The consequence of the industry not earning its cost of capital is that production has fallen by 19% over six years. New mine supply is falling. South Africa itself accounts for 70% of world platinum production and 39% of world palladium production.

In South Africa, the industry has deferred $5 billion in sustaining capital investments; workers are dying and infrastructure is more and more decrepit.

A skilled worker crouching 7,000 feet underground in 105-degree heat in two inches of water makes $700 per month. An unskilled worker who mucks the material on his hands and knees 400 meters from the mine face to the adit makes $200 a month. A migratory worker sustaining a family in the homeland is probably sustaining another family at the mine face. Wages have to go up, but they can't because the companies don't earn their cost of capital.

According to the majority of South Africans, social take—taxes and royalties—has to go up, but can't because companies don't earn their cost of capital.

Prices have to go up. Platinum and palladium prices can go up because their utility to users is so high. It goes into high-carat jewelry. Platinum goes up a smokestack. Mostly, it goes out a tailpipe.

It costs $200—the cost of a catalytic converter in a new car—to give us the air quality we enjoy today. There's a social consensus in favor of stricter air-quality standards. If the price of platinum and palladium doubled, the catalytic converter would cost $400 in a $27,000 new car; the demand impact would be de minimus.

LJ: We all know the often-quoted phrase that most of the gold ever mined in the world is still sitting in purified form on the surface in one form or the other. Platinum and palladium are different; they are consumed. I agree with Rick.

I would go one step further regarding South Africa. It's not just the economics that don't work; it's the country itself. It's a balloon resting on pins. I see platinum and palladium as speculation on South Africa going up in flames, which is an easy bet to take now. I'm sorry for the South Africans, but it's a bad situation with no easy way out.

TGR: There's been a lot of talk about the dearth of young, qualified people coming up to take a place in management teams. Has the next generation of managers—and investors, for that matter—left the sector? If so, what will happen?

MK: There's a significant age gap in our industry. When I was taking geology courses at university, our professor would ask why we were taking this class. There were no jobs. He recommended we go into computers, and a lot of people did.

Unfortunately, good management teams are very difficult to come by. Only 1 in 3,000 projects ever becomes an economic mine, and I'd say investing in the right people is more important than any other factor.

LJ: This scarcity makes the investor's job a little easier. Just type the CEO's name in Google and look up his history. Has he done this before? Has he succeeded? Was he an accountant or a used car salesman? Google is one of our primary triage tools.

People is the first of Doug Casey's famous Eight Ps. If I hear about a story that fits our general criteria, the first thing I look at is management and directors. If I recognize the name of someone who has lied to me or whom I don't trust, I don't even look at the project.

TGR: New people coming up need to get experience by being in a successful project. Are there enough successful projects that they're learning how to do it?

LJ: I don't necessarily agree with that angle. All experience is good experience. A person can learn a lot from working for a company that does something wrong. It's having lots of experience, both good and bad, that is so important. The problem is that, unless you get very lucky, you need to have experience to really call shots well, and there are not enough people out there with the decades of experience needed.

On the bright side, because there is money in the field now, geology departments are no longer shutting down; enrollment is up. Supply is improving, but it will be another 5 to 10 years before the supply of highly experienced personnel really improves.

RR: Let's personalize it for your readers. There are three analysts in the room: an old one and two young ones. I guarantee you that, as a consequence of the bear market they just experienced, the two younger analysts will make their readers more money with less risk in the next bull market.

Youth isn't enough. You need to have a decade under your belt so that you have lived through the changes. Marin and Louis just lived through the kind of challenges I lived through in the 1980s. They now have the two things needed to survive in this racket: legs and scars.

MK: He's not joking about the scars.

RR: The transfer of the mantle from the Doug Caseys and Rick Rules of the world to the Marin Katusas and Louis Jameses is under way. The batons are being passed.

TGR: Is the bear market making a better generation of investors? Will they be more patient, have more perspective given what they've been through?

MK: If they stick with it. It's all about timeframe and perspective. The bear market will wash out a lot of investors; do not allow yourself to become a victim. But as Rick said, investors have to mitigate risk to stay alive until the next leg in the bull market.

RR: You're wrong there, Marin. You have to thrive. The year 2000, which was the market bottom, was one of the best investment years of my life. And 2001 was even better, as was 2002.

A bear market is when you make your money. You don't get to put it in your pocket until things turn, but you make your money by thriving in bear markets. You don't thrive in bull markets. You cash the checks. It's very different.

LJ: I expect this will be a painful experience for a lot of people. Some will learn a lesson, but it will be the wrong lesson. The lesson will be: Don't invest in commodities; they're too risky. That lesson will stick until the prices go bananas again, when they'll give it another try and get taken to the cleaners again.

To buy low and sell high, investors have to be able to sell high, which means they are expecting people to act irrationally when prices are very high—which means they didn't learn the lesson. It's unfortunate for our world that human nature is so, but it is so, and investors who ignore the opportunities this creates don't do anyone any favors.

TGR: Marin, going back to energy, there's been a lot in the media about the International Energy Agency (IEA) report about energy independence in North America. Will we be the Saudi Arabia of natural gas?

MK: North America is already the Saudi Arabia of natural gas. Unfortunately, so are the Russians.

The report said that if these eight assumptions happen the way we hope, America will become almost energy independent. The media forgot about the eight assumptions, and they got rid of the word "almost."
The US has done a great job of bringing North American innovation to the shale industry, but the industry has many other challenges to work through.

TGR: Is Saudi Arabia still the Saudi Arabia of oil? Its wells are getting long in the tooth, and the country is building nuclear plants for domestic use.

MK: We're all asking that question. The Ghawar oil field has been producing oil since before Elvis hit the scene and today produces about half of Saudi Arabia's oil. There is significant risk in relying on these old elephant deposits that have been producing for more than 50 years.

RR: I agree. What has happened in the US, and to a lesser degree Canada, is unique because our competitive markets still work. For example, 50 or 60 competitors at Eagle Ford tried and failed using various completion techniques, each time getting better and better. Ultimately, Eagle Ford was an extremely messy success.

In most of the world, there's one quasi-state oil company looking at a basin. There's no competition trying different solutions. Exporting American or Canadian technology doesn't work without exporting the messiness of the North American energy-exploration business.

Marin, would exporting technology from Eagle Ford work in Argentina's Vaca Muerta Shale?

MK: It would take billions of dollars to make it work at Vaca Muerta. A junior company with a $10 million market cap and $500,000 to make management's salary and payment on their BMWs will never be able to develop this billion-dollar shale potential. It will require a big company, like a Chevron.

TGR: We heard a lot about the potential for crowdfunding to save the resource sector by funding more companies. True?

MK: I'd like to make sure that all of your readers stay the hell away from crowdfunding for the resource sector. I've heard it works OK in the tech sector and among the let's-make-a-movie crowd, where all that is needed is to raise $150,000 for something that may or may not work.

In the resource sector, real exploration cannot be done for $2-3 million. If people want to invest in the sector, go to someone with a track record, someone who knows what he's doing. Subscribe to Louis' newsletter and educate yourself. Stay the hell away from crowdfunding for the resource sector.

RR: The last thing the sector needs is more companies. The idea that the crowd would invest $3 million in a de novo project when there are companies out there that have spent $80 million on an existing project, yet have a $6 million market cap is the most counterproductive activity that one could imagine. If there are 3,000 public companies doing exploration on a global basis, we don't need another 300. We need 2,000 fewer.

LJ: It's one thing to go directly to the masses with an art project that some snob at the National Endowment for the Arts turned down, but entirely another to do so for a mine project no knowledgeable investor will touch.

TGR: What myth would you want our readers to stop believing in?

LJ: I would like to dethrone the "grade is king" myth. It's not grade; it's margin. You can have an exceptionally high-grade deposit in an exceptionally expensive, difficult, or kleptocratic jurisdiction, and it won't work. You could have a water table that's so fluid that you spend more money pumping water than mining. There are so many things that can go wrong or add to costs. Too many people believe if a project is high grade, it has to make money. No, it doesn't. High margin is paramount, not grade.

MK: I think the myth that the commodity bull market is over is insane. We're nowhere near being over. This is the opportunity of a lifetime. This is when you start doing your homework and investing money.

RR: The idea that bear markets are bad and bull markets are good is bullshit. It's the other way around. Bear markets are good. Bull markets are bad.

LJ: Bullshit is a technical term.

TGR: I enjoyed talking with the three of you. Thanks.


Hungry for more insights like these? Want specific, actionable recommendations to accompany them? These are the kinds of exchanges that have made Casey Summits must-attend events for resource investors… not to mention why they consistently sell out.
If you missed the 3 Days with Casey Summit and its all-star lineup—
which included Ron Paul, Lacy Hunt, James Rickards, Catherine Austin Fitts, and Dr. Elizabeth Vliet, among many others—you can still listen in on every session… every breakout session… every Q&A… by preordering the Casey Summit Audio Collection. 

It includes all this plus images of any visual aids each speaker used. And if you order while they're in production, you'll enjoy substantial savings.