The World's First Cashless Society Is Here - A Totalitarian's Dream Come True

By Nick Giambruno

Central planners around the world are waging a War on Cash. In just the last few years:

• Italy made cash transactions over €1,000 illegal;
• Switzerland proposed banning cash payments in excess of 100,000 francs;
• Russia banned cash transactions over $10,000;
• Spain banned cash transactions over €2,500;
• Mexico made cash payments of more than 200,000 pesos illegal;
• Uruguay banned cash transactions over $5,000; and
• France made cash transactions over €1,000 illegal, down from the previous limit of €3,000.

The War on Cash is a favorite pet project of the economic central planners. They want to eliminate hand-to-hand currency so that governments can document, control, and tax everything. This is why they’re lowering the threshold for mandatory reporting of cash transactions and, in some instances, simply making it illegal to pay cash.

In the U.S., central planners ratchet up the War on Cash every time the government declares a made-up war on something else…a war on crime, a war on drugs, a war on poverty, a war on terror…..

They all end with more government intrusion into your financial affairs. Thanks to these made-up wars, the U.S. government is imposing an increasing number of regulations on cash transactions. Try withdrawing more than $10,000 in cash from your bank. They’ll treat you like a criminal or terrorist. The Federal Reserve is at the center of the War on Cash. Its weapons are inflation and control over the currency denominations.

Take the $100 note, for example. It’s the largest bill in circulation today. This was not always the case. At one point, the U.S. had $500, $1,000, $5,000, and even $10,000 notes. But the government eliminated these large notes in 1969 under the pretext of fighting the War on Some Drugs. Since then, the $100 note has been the largest. But it has far less purchasing power than it did in 1969. Decades of rampant money printing have inflated the dollar. Today, a $100 note buys less than a $20 note did in 1969.

Even though the Federal Reserve has devalued the dollar over 80% since 1969, it still refuses to issue notes larger than $100. This makes it inconvenient to use cash for large transactions, which forces people to use electronic payment methods. This, of course, is what the U.S. government wants. It’s exactly like Ron Paul said: “The cashless society is the IRS’s dream: total knowledge of, and control over, the finances of every single American.”

Policymakers or Central Planners?

On stories related to the War on Cash, you may have noticed that the mainstream media often uses the word “policymakers,” as in “policymakers have decided to keep interest rates at record low levels.” When the media uses “policymakers,” they are often referring to central bank officials. It’s a curious word choice. As far as I can tell, there is no difference between a policymaker and central planner. Most people who want to live in a free society agree that central planning is not a good idea. So the media uses a different word to put a more neutral spin on things.

To help you think more clearly, I suggest substituting “central planners” every time you see “policymakers.”

The World’s First Cashless Society

In 1661, Sweden became the first country in Europe to issue paper money. Now it’s probably going to be the first in the world to eliminate it. Sweden has already phased out most cash transactions. According to Credit Suisse, 80% of all purchases in Sweden are electronic and don’t involve cash. And that figure is rising. If the trend continues - and there is nothing to suggest it won’t - Sweden could soon be the world’s first cashless society.

Sweden’s supply of physical currency has dropped over 50% in the last six years. A couple of major Swedish banks no longer carry cash. Virtually all Swedes pay for candy bars and coffee electronically. Even homeless street vendors use mobile card readers. Plus, an increasing number of government restrictions are encouraging Swedes to dump cash. The pretexts are familiar…fighting terrorism, money laundering, etc. In effect, these restrictions make it inconvenient to use cash, so people don’t.

So far, Swedes have passively accepted the government and banks’ drive to eliminate cash. The push to destroy their financial privacy doesn’t seem to bother them. This is likely because the average Swede places an unreasonable amount of trust in government and financial institutions. Their trust is certainly misplaced. On top of the obvious privacy concerns, eliminating cash enables the central planners’ latest gimmick to goose the economy: Negative interest rates.

Making The Negative Interest Rate Scam Possible

Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland all have negative interest rates. Negative interest rates mean the lender literally pays the borrower for the privilege of lending him money. It’s a bizarre, upside down concept. But negative rates are not some European anomaly. The Federal Reserve discussed the possibility of using negative interest rates in the U.S. at its last meeting. Negative rates could not exist in a free market. They destroy the impetus to save and build capital, which is the basis of prosperity.

When you deposit money in a bank, you are lending money to the bank. However, with negative rates you don’t earn interest. Instead, you pay the bank. If you don’t like that plan, you can certainly stash your cash under the mattress. As a practical matter, this limits how far governments and central banks can go with negative interest rates. The more it costs to store money at the bank, the less inclined people are to do it.

Of course, central planners don’t want you to withdraw money from the bank. This is a big reason why they want to eliminate cash…so you can’t. As long as your money stays in the bank, it’s vulnerable to the sting of negative interest rates and also helps to prop up the unsound fractional reserve banking system. If you can’t withdraw your money as cash, you have two choices: You can deal with negative interest rates...or you can spend your money.

Ultimately, that’s what our Keynesian central planners want. They are using negative interest rates and the War on Cash to force you to spend and “stimulate” the economy. If you ask me, these radical and insane measures are a sign of desperation. The War on Cash and negative interest rates are huge threats to your financial security. Central planners are playing with fire and inviting a currency catastrophe.

Most people have no idea what really happens when a currency collapses, let alone how to prepare. How will you protect your savings in the event of a currency crisis? This just-released video will show you exactly how. Click here to watch it now.

The article was originally published at internationalman.com.

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The Burning Questions For 2015

By John Mauldin

Louis Gave is one of my favorite investment and economic thinkers, besides being a good friend and an all-around fun guy. When he and his father Charles and the well-known European journalist Anatole Kaletsky decided to form Gavekal some 15 years ago, Louis moved to Hong Kong, as they felt that Asia and especially China would be a part of the world they would have to understand. Since then Gavekal has expanded its research offices all over the world. The Gavekal team’s various research arms produce an astounding amount of work on an incredibly wide range of topics, but somehow Louis always seems to be on top of all of it.

Longtime readers know that I often republish a piece by someone in their firm (typically Charles or Louis). I have to be somewhat judicious, as their research is actually quite expensive, but they kindly give me permission to share it from time to time.

This week, for your Outside the Box reading, I bring you one of the more thought-provoking pieces I’ve read from Louis in some time. In Thoughts from the Frontline I have been looking at world problems we need to focus on as we enter 2015. Today, Louis also gives us a piece along these lines, called “The Burning Questions for 2015,” in which he thinks about a “Chinese Marshall Plan” (and what a stronger US dollar might do to China), Abenomics as a “sideshow,” US capital misallocation, and whether or not we should even care about Europe. I think you will find the piece well worth your time.

Think about this part of his conclusion as you read:

Most investors go about their job trying to identify ‘winners’. But more often than not, investing is about avoiding losers. Like successful gamblers at the racing track, an investor’s starting point should be to eliminate the assets that do not stand a chance, and then spread the rest of one’s capital amongst the remainder.

Wise words indeed.

A Yellow Card from Barry

What you don’t often get to see is the lively debate that happens among my friends about my writing, even as I comment on theirs. Barry Ritholtz of The Big Picture pulled a yellow card on me over a piece of data he contended I had cherry picked from Zero Hedge. He has a point. I should have either not copied that sentence (the rest of the quote was OK) or noted the issue date. Quoting Barry:

Did you cherry pick this a little much? 

“… because since December 2007, or roughly the start of the global depression, shale oil states have added 1.36 million jobs while non-shale states have lost 424,000 jobs.”

I must point out how intellectually disingenuous this start date is, heading right into the crisis – why not use December 2010? Or 5 or 10 years? This is misleading in other ways:

It is geared to start before the crisis & recovery, so that it forces the 10 million jobs lost in the crisis to be offset by the 10 million new jobs added since the recovery began. That creates a very misleading picture of where growth comes from.

We have created 10 million new jobs since June 2009. Has Texas really created 4 million new jobs? The answer is no.

According to [the St. Louis Fed] FRED [database]:

PAYEMS – or NFP – has gone from 130,944 to 140,045, a gain of 9,101 over that period.
TXNA – Total Nonfarm in Texas – has gone from 10,284 to 11,708, for a gain of 1,424.

That gain represents 15.6% of the 9.1MM total.

Well yes, Barry, but because of oil and other things (like a business-friendly climate), Texas did not lose as many jobs in the recession as the rest of the nation did, which is where you can get skewed data, depending on when you start the count and what you are trying to illustrate.

My main point is that energy production has been a huge upside producer of jobs, and that source of new jobs is going away. And yes, Josh, the net benefit for at least the first six months until the job non production shows up (if it does) is a positive for the economy and the consumer. But I was trying to highlight a potential problem that could hurt US growth. Oil is likely to go to $40 before settling in the $50 range for a while. Will it eventually go back up? Yes. But it’s anybody’s guess as to when.

By the way, a former major hedge fund manager who closed his fund a number of years ago casually mentioned at a party the other night that he hopes oil goes to $35 and that we see a true shakeout in the oil patch. He grew up in a West Texas oil family and truly understands the cycles in the industry, especially for the smaller producers. From his point of view, a substantial shakeout creates massive upside opportunities in lots of places. “Almost enough,” he said, “to tempt me to open a new fund.”

On a different note, everyone is Christmas shopping and trying to find the right gift. Two recommendations. First, the Panasonic wet/dry electric razor (with five blades). I just bought a new set of blades and covers for mine after two years (you do have to replace them every now and then); and the new, improved shave reminded me how much I was in love with it when I bought it. Best shaver ever.

Second, and I know this is a little odd, but for a number of years I’ve been recommending a face cream that contains skin stem cells, which I and quite a number of my readers have noticed really helps rejuvenate our older skin. (I came across the product while researching stem cell companies with Patrick Cox.) It clearly makes a difference for some people. I get ladies coming up all the time and thanking me for the recommendation, and guys too sometimes shyly admit they use it regularly. (It turns out that just as many men buy the product as women.) The company is Lifeline Skin Care, and they have discounted the product for my readers. If you can get past the fact that this is a financial analyst recommending a skin cream for a Christmas gift, then click on this link.

It is time to hit the send button. I trust you are having a good week. Now settle in and grab a cup of coffee or some wine (depending on the time of day and your mood), and let’s see what Louis has to say.
Your trying to catch up analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Boxsubscribers@mauldineconomics.com

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The Burning Questions For 2015

By Louis-Vincent Gave, GavekalDragonomics

With two reports a day, and often more, readers sometimes complain that keeping tabs on the thoughts of the various Gavekal analysts can be a challenge. So as the year draws to a close, it may be helpful if we recap the main questions confronting investors and the themes we strongly believe in, region by region.

1. A Chinese Marshall Plan?

When we have conversations with clients about China – which typically we do between two and four times a day – the talk invariably revolves around how much Chinese growth is slowing (a good bit, and quite quickly); how undercapitalized Chinese banks are (a good bit, but fat net interest margins and preferred share issues are solving the problem over time); how much overcapacity there is in real estate (a good bit, but – like youth – this is a problem that time will fix); how much overcapacity there is in steel, shipping, university graduates and corrupt officials; how disruptive China’s adoption of assembly line robots will be etc.

All of these questions are urgent, and the problems that prompted them undeniably real, which means that China’s policymakers certainly have their plates full. But this is where things get interesting: in all our conversations with Western investors, their conclusion seems to be that Beijing will have little choice but to print money aggressively, devalue the renminbi, fiscally stimulate the economy, and basically follow the path trail-blazed (with such success?) by Western policymakers since 2008. However, we would argue that this conclusion represents a failure both to think outside the Western box and to read Beijing’s signal flags.

In numerous reports (and in Chapters 11 to 14 of Too Different For Comfort) we have argued that the internationalization of the renminbi has been one of the most significant macro events of recent years. This internationalization is continuing apace: from next to nothing in 2008, almost a quarter of Chinese trade will settle in renminbi in 2014:

This is an important development which could have a very positive impact on a number of emerging markets. Indeed, a typical, non oil exporting emerging market policymaker (whether in Turkey, the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Argentina or India) usually has to worry about two things that are completely out of his control:

1)   A spike in the US dollar. Whenever the US currency shoots up, it presents a hurdle for growth in most emerging markets. The first reason is that most trade takes place in US dollars, so a stronger US dollar means companies having to set aside more money for working capital needs. The second is that most emerging market investors tend to think in two currencies: their own and the US dollar. Catch a cab in Bangkok, Cairo, Cape Town or Jakarta and ask for that day’s US dollar exchange rate and chances are that the driver will know it to within a decimal point. This sensitivity to exchange rates is important because it means that when the US dollar rises, local wealth tends to flow out of local currencies as investors sell domestic assets and into US dollar assets, typically treasuries (when the US dollar falls, the reverse is true).

2)   A rapid rise in oil or food prices. Violent spikes in oil and food prices can be highly destabilizing for developing countries, where the median family spends so much more of their income on basic necessities than the typical Western family. Sudden spikes in the price of food or energy can quickly create social and political tensions. And that’s not all; for oil importing countries, a spike in oil prices can lead to a rapid deterioration in trade balances. These tend to scare foreign investors away, so pushing the local currency lower and domestic interest rates higher, which in turn leads to weaker growth etc...

Looking at these two concerns, it is hard to escape the conclusion that, as things stand, China is helping to mitigate both:

• China’s policy of renminbi internationalization means that emerging markets are able gradually to reduce their dependence on the US dollar. As they do, spikes in the value of the US currency (such as we have seen in 2014) are becoming less painful.
   
• The slowdown in Chinese oil demand, as well as China’s ability to capitalize on Putin’s difficulties to transform itself from a price taker to a price setter, means that the impact of oil and commodities on trade balances is much more contained.

Beyond providing stability to emerging markets, the gradual acceptance of the renminbi as a secondary trading and reserve currency for emerging markets has further implications. The late French economist Jacques Rueff showed convincingly how, when global trade moved from a gold based settlement system to a U.S. dollar based system, purchasing power was duplicated. As the authors of a recent Wall Street Journal article citing Reuff’s work explained: “If the Banque de France counts among its reserves dollar claims (and not just gold and French francs) – for example a Banque de France deposit in a New York bank – this increases the money supply in France but without reducing the money supply of the US. So both countries can use these dollar assets to grant credit.” Replace Banque de France with Bank Indonesia, and U.S. dollar with renminbi and the same causes will lead to the same effects.

Consider British Columbia’s recently issued AAA rated two year renminbi dim sum bond. Yielding 2.85%, this bond was actively subscribed to by foreign central banks, which ended up receiving more than 50% of the initial allocation (ten times as much as in the first British Columbia dim sum issue two years ago). After the issue British Columbia takes the proceeds and deposits them in a Chinese bank, thereby capturing a nice spread. In turn, the Chinese bank can multiply this money five times over (so goes money creation in China). Meanwhile, the Indonesian, Korean or Kazakh central banks that bought the bonds now have an asset on their balance sheet which they can use to back an expansion of trade with China...

Of course, for trade to flourish, countries need to be able to specialize in their respective comparative advantages, hence the importance of the kind of free trade deals discussed at the recent APEC meeting. But free trade deals are not enough; countries also need trade infrastructure (ports, airports, telecoms, trade finance banks etc...). This brings us to China’s ‘new silk road’ strategy and the recent announcement by Beijing of a US$40bn fund to help finance road and rail infrastructure in the various ‘stans’ on its western borders in a development that promises to cut the travel time from China to Europe from the current 30 days by sea to ten days or less overland.

Needless to say, such a dramatic reduction in transportation time could help prompt some heavy industry to relocate from Europe to Asia.

That’s not all. At July’s BRICS summit in Brazil, leaders of the five member nations signed a treaty launching the U.S. $50bn New Development Bank, which Beijing hopes will be modeled on China Development Bank, and is likely to compete with the World Bank. This will be followed by the establishment of a China-dominated BRICS contingency fund (challenging the International Monetary Fund). Also on the cards is an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to rival the Asian Development Bank.

So what looks likely to take shape over the next few years is a network of railroads and motorways linking China’s main production centers to Bangkok, Singapore, Karachi, Almaty, Moscow, Yangon, Kolkata. We will see pipelines, dams, and power plants built in Siberia, Central Asia, Pakistan and Myanmar; as well as airports, hotels, business centers... and all of this financed with China’s excess savings, and leverage. Given that China today has excess production capacity in all of these sectors, one does not need a fistful of university diplomas to figure out whose companies will get the pick of the construction contracts.

But to finance all of this, and to transform herself into a capital exporter, China needs stable capital markets and a strong, convertible currency. This explains why, despite Hong Kong’s pro democracy demonstrations, Beijing is pressing ahead with the internationalization of the renminbi using the former British colony as its proving ground (witness the Shanghai-HK stock connect scheme and the removal of renminbi restrictions on Hong Kong residents). And it is why renminbi bonds have delivered better risk adjusted returns over the past five years than almost any other fixed income market.

Of course, China’s strategy of internationalizing the renminbi, and integrating its neighbors into its own economy might fall flat on its face. Some neighbors bitterly resent China’s increasing assertiveness.

Nonetheless, the big story in China today is not ‘ghost cities’ (how long has that one been around?) or undercapitalized banks. The major story is China’s reluctance to continue funneling its excess savings into US treasuries yielding less than 2%, and its willingness to use that capital instead to integrate its neighbors’ economies with its own; using its own currency and its low funding costs as an ‘appeal product’ (and having its own companies pick up the contracts as a bonus). In essence, is this so different from what the US did in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s with the Marshall Plan?

2. Japan: Is Abenomics just a sideshow?

With Japan in the middle of a triple dip recession, and Japanese households suffering a significant contraction in real disposable income, it might seem that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has chosen an odd time to call a snap election. Three big factors explain his decision:

1)   The Japanese opposition is in complete disarray. So Abe’s decision may primarily have been opportunistic.

2)   We must remember that Abe is the most nationalist prime minister Japan has produced in a generation. The expansion of China’s economic presence across Central and South East Asia will have left him feeling at least as uncomfortable as anyone who witnessed his Apec handshake with Xi Jinping three weeks ago. It is not hard to imagine that Abe returned from Beijing convinced that he needs to step up Japan’s military development; a policy that requires him to command a greater parliamentary majority than he holds now.

3)   The final factor explaining Abe’s decision to call an election may be that in Japan the government’s performance in opinion polls seems to mirror the performance of the local stock market (wouldn’t Barack Obama like to see such a correlation in the US?). With the Nikkei breaking out to new highs, Abe may feel that now is the best time to try and cement his party’s dominant position in the Diet.

As he gets ready to face the voters, how should Abe attempt to portray himself? In our view, he could do worse than present himself as Japan Inc’s biggest salesman. Since the start of his second mandate, Abe has visited 49 countries in 21 months, and taken hundreds of different Japanese CEOs along with him for the ride. The message these CEOs have been spreading is simple: Japan is a very different place from 20 years ago. Companies are doing different things, and investment patterns have changed. Many companies have morphed into completely different animals, and are delivering handsome returns as a result. The relative year to date outperformances of Toyo Tire (+117%), Minebea (+95%), Mabuchi (+57%), Renesas (+43%), Fuji Film (+33%), NGK Insulators (+33%) and Nachi-Fujikoshi (+19%) have been enormous. Or take Panasonic as an example: the old television maker has transformed itself into a car parts firm, piggy backing on the growth of Tesla’s model S.

Yet even as these changes have occurred, most foreign investors have stopped visiting Japan, and most sell-side firms have stopped funding genuine and original research. For the alert investor this is good news. As the number of Japanese firms at the heart of the disruptions reshaping our global economy – robotics, electric and self-driving cars, alternative energy, healthcare, care for the elderly – continues to expand, and as the number of investors looking at these same firms continues to shrink, those investors willing to sift the gravel of corporate Japan should be able to find real gems.

Which brings us to the real question confronting investors today: the ‘Kuroda put’ has placed Japanese equities back on investor’s maps. But is this just a short term phenomenon? After all, no nation has ever prospered by devaluing its currency. If Japan is set to attract, and retain, foreign investor flows, it will have to come up with a more compelling story than ‘we print money faster than anyone else’.

In our recent research, we have argued that this is exactly what is happening. In fact, we believe so much in the opportunity that we have launched a dedicated Japan corporate research service (GK Plus Alpha) whose principals (Alicia Walker and Neil Newman) are burning shoe leather to identify the disruptive companies that will trigger Japan’s next wave of growth.

3. Should we worry about capital misallocation in the US?

The US has now ‘enjoyed’ a free cost of money for some six years. The logic behind the zero-interest rate policy was simple enough: after the trauma of 2008, the animal spirits of entrepreneurs needed to be prodded back to life. Unfortunately, the last few years have reminded everyone that the average entrepreneur or investor typically borrows for one of two reasons:

• Capital spending: Business is expanding, so our entrepreneur borrows to open a new plant, or hire more people, etc.
   
• Financial engineering: The entrepreneur or investor borrows in order to purchase an existing cash flow, or stream of income. In this case, our borrower calculates the present value of a given income stream, and if this present value is higher than the cost of the debt required to own it, then the transaction makes sense.

Unfortunately, the second type of borrowing does not lead to an increase in the stock of capital. It simply leads to a change in the ownership of capital at higher and higher prices, with the ownership of an asset often moving away from entrepreneurs and towards financial middlemen or institutions. So instead of an increase in an economy’s capital stock (as we would get with increased borrowing for capital spending), with financial engineering all we see is a net increase in the total amount of debt and a greater concentration of asset ownership. And the higher the debt levels and ownership concentration, the greater the system’s fragility and its inability to weather shocks.

We are not arguing that financial engineering has reached its natural limits in the US. Who knows where those limits stand in a zero interest rate world? However, we would highlight that the recent new highs in US equities have not been accompanied by new lows in corporate spreads. Instead, the spread between 5-year BBB bonds and 5-year US treasuries has widened by more than 30 basis points since this summer.

Behind these wider spreads lies a simple reality: corporate bonds issued by energy sector companies have lately been taken to the woodshed. In fact, the spread between the bonds of energy companies, and those of other US corporates are back at highs not seen since the recession of 2001-2002, when the oil price was at US$30 a barrel.

The market’s behavior raises the question whether the energy industry has been the black hole of capital misallocation in the era of quantitative easing. As our friend Josh Ayers of Paradarch Advisors (Josh publishes a weekly entitled The Right Tale, which is a fount of interesting ideas. He can be reached at josh@paradarchadvisors.com) put it in a recent note: “After surviving the resource nadir of the late 1980s and 1990s, oil and gas firms started pumping up capex as the new millennium began. However, it wasn’t until the purported end of the global financial crisis in 2009 that capital expenditure in the oil patch went into hyperdrive, at which point capex from the S&P 500’s oil and gas subcomponents jumped from roughly 7% of total US fixed investment to over 10% today.”

“It’s no secret that a decade’s worth of higher global oil prices justified much of the early ramp-up in capex, but a more thoughtful look at the underlying data suggests we’re now deep in the malinvestment phase of the oil and gas business cycle. The second chart (above) displays both the total annual capex and the return on that capex (net income/capex) for the ten largest holdings in the Energy Select Sector SPDR (XLE). The most troublesome aspect of this chart is that, since 2010, returns have been declining as capex outlays are increasing. Furthermore, this divergence is occurring despite WTI crude prices averaging nearly $96 per barrel during that period,” Josh noted.

The energy sector may not be the only place where capital has been misallocated on a grand scale. The other industry with a fairly large target on its back is the financial sector. For a start, policymakers around the world have basically decided that, for all intents and purposes, whenever a ‘decision maker’ in the financial industry makes a decision, someone else should be looking over the decision maker’s shoulder to ensure that the decision is appropriate. Take HSBC’s latest results: HSBC added 1400 compliance staff in one quarter, and plans to add another 1000 over the next quarter. From this, we can draw one of two conclusions:

1)   The financial firms that will win are the large firms, as they can afford the compliance costs.

2)   The winners will be the firms that say: “Fine, let’s get rid of the decision maker. Then we won’t need to hire the compliance guy either”.

This brings us to a theme first explored by our friend Paul Jeffery, who back in September wrote: “In 1994 Bill Gates observed: ‘Banking is necessary, banks are not’. The primary function of a bank is to bring savers and users of capital together in order to facilitate an exchange. In return for their role as [trusted] intermediaries banks charge a generous net spread. To date, this hefty added cost has been accepted by the public due to the lack of a credible alternative, as well as the general oligopolistic structure of the banking industry.

What Lending Club and other P2P lenders do is provide an online market place that connects borrowers and lenders directly; think the eBay of loans and you have the right conceptual grasp. Moreover, the business model of online market-place lending breaks with a banking tradition, dating back to 14th century Florence, of operating on a “fractional reserve” basis. In the case of P2P intermediation, lending can be thought of as being “fully reserved” and entails no balance sheet risk on the part of the service facilitator. Instead, the intermediary receives a fee- based revenue stream rather than a spread-based income.”

There is another way we can look at it: finance today is an abnormal industry in two important ways:

1)   The more the sector spends on information and communications technology, the bigger a proportion of the economic pie the industry captures. This is a complete anomaly. In all other industries (retail, energy, telecoms...), spending on ICT has delivered savings for the consumers. In finance, investment in ICT (think shaving seconds of trading times in order to front run customer orders legally) has not delivered savings for consumers, nor even bigger dividends for shareholders, but fatter bonuses and profits for bankers.

2)   The second way finance is an abnormal industry (perhaps unsurprisingly given the first factor) lies in the banks’ inability to pass on anything of value to their customers, at least as far as customer’s perceptions are concerned. Indeed, in ‘brand surveys’ and ‘consumer satisfaction reports’, banks regularly bring up the rear. Who today loves their bank in a way that some people ‘love’ Walmart, Costco, IKEA, Amazon, Apple, Google, Uber, etc?

Most importantly, and as Paul highlights above, if the whole point of the internet is to:

a) measure more efficiently what each individual needs, and

b) eliminate unnecessary intermediaries,

then we should expect a lot of the financial industry’s safe and steady margins to come under heavy pressure. This has already started in the broking and in the money management industries (where mediocre money managers and other closet indexers are being replaced by ETFs). But why shouldn’t we start to see banks’ high return consumer loan, SME loan and credit card loan businesses replaced, at a faster and faster pace, by peer-to-peer lending? Why should consumers continue to pay high fees for bank transfers, or credit cards when increasingly such services are offered at much lower costs by firms such as TransferWise, services like Alipay and Apple Pay, or simply by new currencies such as Bitcoin?

On this point, we should note that in the 17 days that followed the launch of Apple Pay on the iPhone 6, almost 1% of Wholefoods’ transactions were processed using the new payment system. The likes of Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon have grown into behemoths by upending the media, advertising retail and entertainment industries. Such a rapid take- up rate for Apple Pay is a powerful indicator which sector is likely to be next in line. How else can these tech giants keep growing and avoid the fate that befell Sony, Microsoft and Nokia? On their past record, the technology companies will find margins, and growth, in upending our countries’ financial infrastructure. As they do, a lot of capital (both human and monetary) deployed in the current infrastructure will find itself obsolete.

This possibility raises a number of questions – not least for Gavekal’s own investment process, which relies heavily on changes in the velocity of money and in the willingness and ability of commercial banks to multiply money, to judge whether it makes sense to increase portfolio risk. What happens to a world that moves ‘ex-bank’ and where most new loans are extended peer-to-peer? In such a world, the banking multiplier disappears along with fractional reserve banking (and consequently the need for regulators? Dare to dream...).

As bankers stop lending their clients umbrellas when it is sunny, and taking them away when it rains, will our economic cycles become much tamer? As central banks everywhere print money aggressively, could the market be in the process of creating currencies no longer based on the borders of nation states, but instead on the cross-border networks of large corporations (Alipay, Apple Pay...), or even on voluntary communities (Bitcoin). Does this mean we are approaching the Austrian dream of a world with many, non government-supported, currencies?

4. Should we care about Europe?

In our September Quarterly Strategy Chartbook, we debated whether the eurozone was set for a revival (the point expounded by François) or a continued period stuck in the doldrums (Charles’s view), or whether we should even care (my point). At the crux of this divergence in views is the question whether euroland is broadly following the Japanese deflationary bust path. Pointing to this possibility are the facts that 11 out of 15 eurozone countries are now registering annual year-on-year declines in CPI, that policy responses have so far been late, unclear and haphazard (as they were in Japan), and that the solutions mooted (e.g. European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker’s €315bn infrastructure spending plan) recall the solutions adopted in Japan (remember all those bridges to nowhere?). And that’s before going into the structural parallels: ageing populations; dysfunctional, undercapitalized and overcrowded banking systems; influential segments of the population eager to maintain the status quo etc....

With the same causes at work, should we expect the same consequences? Does the continued underperformance of eurozone stocks simply reflect that managing companies in a deflationary environment is a very challenging task? If euroland has really entered a Japanese-style deflationary bust likely to extend years into the future, the conclusion almost draws itself.

The main lesson investors have learned from the Japanese experience of 1990-2013 is that the only time to buy stocks in an economy undergoing a deflationary bust is:

a)   when stocks are massively undervalued relative both to their peers and to their own history, and

b)   when a significant policy change is on the way.

This was the situation in Japan in 1999 (the first round of QE under PM Keizo Obuchi), 2005 (PM Junichiro Koizumi’s bank recapitalization program) and of course in 2013-14 (Abenomics). Otherwise, in a deflationary environment with no or low growth, there is no real reason to pile into equities. One does much better in debt. So, if the Japan-Europe parallel runs true, it only makes sense to look at eurozone equities when they are both massively undervalued relative to their own histories and there are expectations of a big policy change. This was the case in the spring of 2012 when valuations were at extremes, and Mario Draghi replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as ECB president. In the absence of these two conditions, the marginal dollar looking for equity risk will head for sunnier climes.

With this in mind, there are two possible arguments for an exposure to eurozone equities:

1)   The analogy of Japan is misleading as euroland will not experience a deflationary bust (or will soon emerge from deflation).

2)   We are reaching the point when our two conditions – attractive valuations, combined with policy shock and awe – are about to be met. Thus we could be reaching the point when euroland equities start to deliver outsized returns.

Proponents of the first argument will want to overweight euroland equities now, as this scenario should lead to a rebound in both the euro and European equities (so anyone underweight in their portfolios would struggle). However, it has to be said that the odds against this first outcome appear to get longer with almost every data release!

Proponents of the second scenario, however, can afford to sit back and wait, because it is likely any outperformance in eurozone equities would be accompanied by euro currency weakness. Hence, as a percentage of a total benchmark, European equities would not surge, because the rise in equities would be offset by the falling euro.

Alternatively, investors who are skeptical about either of these two propositions can – like us – continue to use euroland as a source of, rather than as a destination for, capital. And they can afford safely to ignore events unfolding in euroland as they seek rewarding investment opportunities in the US or Asia. In short, over the coming years investors may adopt the same view towards the eurozone that they took towards Japan for the last decade: ‘Neither loved, nor hated... simply ignored’.

Conclusion:

Most investors go about their job trying to identify ‘winners’. But more often than not, investing is about avoiding losers. Like successful gamblers at the racing track, an investor’s starting point should be to eliminate the assets that do not stand a chance, and then spread the rest of one’s capital amongst the remainder.

For example, if in 1981 an investor had decided to forego investing in commodities and simply to diversify his holdings across other asset classes, his decision would have been enough to earn himself a decade at the beach. If our investor had then returned to the office in 1990, and again made just one decision – to own nothing in Japan – he could once again have gone back to sipping margaritas for the next ten years. In 2000, the decision had to be not to own overvalued technology stocks. By 2006, our investor needed to start selling his holdings in financials around the world. And by 2008, the money-saving decision would have been to forego investing in euroland.

Of course hindsight is twenty-twenty, and any investor who managed to avoid all these potholes would have done extremely well. Nevertheless, the big question confronting investors today is how to avoid the potholes of tomorrow. To succeed, we believe that investors need to answer the following questions:

• Will Japan engineer a revival through its lead in exciting new technologies (robotics, hi-tech help for the elderly, electric and driverless cars etc...), or will Abenomics prove to be the last hurrah of a society unable to adjust to the 21st century? Our research is following these questions closely through our new GK Plus Alpha venture.
   
• Will China slowly sink under the weight of the past decade’s malinvestment and the accompanying rise in debt (the consensus view) or will it successfully establish itself as Asia’s new hegemon? Our Beijing based research team is very much on top of these questions, especially Tom Miller, who by next Christmas should have a book out charting the geopolitical impact of China’s rise.
   
• Will Indian prime minister Narendra Modi succeed in plucking the low-hanging fruit so visible in India, building new infrastructure, deregulating services, cutting protectionism, etc? If so, will India start to pull its weight in the global economy and financial markets?
   
• How will the world deal with a US economy that may no longer run current account deficits, and may no longer be keen to finance large armies? Does such a combination not almost guarantee the success of China’s strategy?
   
• If the US dollar is entering a long term structural bull market, who are the winners and losers? The knee-jerk reaction has been to say ‘emerging markets will be the losers’ (simply because they were in the past. But the reality is that most emerging markets have large US dollar reserves and can withstand a strong US currency. Instead, will the big losers from the US dollar be the commodity producers?
   
• Have we reached ‘peak demand’ for oil? If so, does this mean that we have years ahead of us in which markets and investors will have to digest the past five years of capital misallocation into commodities?
   
• Talking of capital misallocation, does the continued trend of share buybacks render our financial system more fragile (through higher gearing) and so more likely to crack in the face of exogenous shocks? If it does, one key problem may be that although we may have made our banks safer through increased regulations (since banks are not allowed to take risks anymore), we may well have made our financial markets more volatile (since banks are no longer allowed to trade their balance sheets to benefit from spikes in volatility). This much appeared obvious from the behavior of US fixed income markets in the days following Bill Gross’s departure from PIMCO. In turn, if banks are not allowed to take risks at volatile times, then central banks will always be called upon to act, which guarantees more capital misallocation, share buybacks and further fragilization of the system (expect more debates along this theme between Charles, and Anatole).
   
• Will the financial sector be next to undergo disintermediation by the internet (after advertising and the media). If so, what will the macro consequences be? (Hint: not good for the pound or London property.)
   
• Is euroland following the Japanese deflationary bust roadmap?

The answers to these questions will drive performance for years to come. In the meantime, we continue to believe that a portfolio which avoids a) euroland, b) banks, and c) commodities, will do well – perhaps well enough to continue funding Mediterranean beach holidays – especially as these are likely to go on getting cheaper for anyone not earning euros!

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The article Outside the Box: The Burning Questions For 2015 was originally published at mauldin economics

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War, Peace, and Financial Fireworks

By Casey Research

Politics has long been a driver of international markets and fickle financial systems alike. Everything is connected. Here are some voices from the just concluded Casey Research Fall Summit talking about cause, effect, and war.

James Rickards, senior managing director with Tangent Capital Partners and an audience favorite at investment conferences, says the Middle East, Russia, and China are all working against the U.S. dollar and for gold.

America’s recently improved relationship with Iran is actually bad for the petrodollar, he claims, because the Saudis and the Iranians are bitter enemies. The Russians, for their part, aren’t sitting idly by while the US imposes sanctions on them—aside from Putin being able to freeze US assets in Russia, Rickards believes that Russian hackers may already have the ability to shut down the New York Stock Exchange.

China does want a strong dollar because it still holds over $1 trillion in dollar-denominated assets. But Beijing is aware that eventually the dollar will depreciate, so it’s buying gold to hedge against a decline in the value of the US currency. Current gold reserves are estimated to be between 3,000 and 4,000 tonnes of gold; the ultimate target may be 8,000 tonnes.

Rickards thinks that we are approaching a period of extreme volatility in the U.S. markets and recommends allocating 10% of one’s portfolio to physical gold.

Bud Conrad, chief economist at Casey Research, also is a petrodollar bear. For the past 40 years, he says, the petrodollar has bestowed extraordinary privileges on Americans, but that era is now coming to an end.
Dozens of countries have already set up bilateral trade agreements that circumvent the US dollar. Dollars as a percentage of foreign reserves have declined from 55% in 1999 to 32% today—and could reach 18% by 2019, says Conrad. Ultimately, the petrodollar will fail, which will lead to a rise in sought-after commodities, especially gold.

Conrad thinks the greatest danger we face may be a combined financial and political collapse. Current geopolitical problems are even worse than economic problems, he says, and the trend is toward more, not less, war. Wars, on the other hand, often precipitate financial collapse.

Grant Williams, portfolio and strategy advisor for Vulpes Investment Management in Singapore and editor of the hugely popular newsletter Things That Make You Go Hmmm…, wholeheartedly agrees.

War and financial turmoil have always been inextricably linked, says Williams. Both occur in natural cycles, and one often causes the other. He believes that we’re in an extended period of economic peace because the Federal Reserve has used monetary policy “to abolish the bottom half of the business cycle.”

Although that may sound like a good thing, it is not. The business cycle, argues Williams, is inevitable and natural; we need it to cleanse the economy. But the Fed has leveraged to such unsustainable levels to “keep the peace” that the inevitable fallout will be that much worse.

He foresees serious wars to accompany the coming financial turmoil. Today’s geopolitical setup, he says, is similar to 1914’s. In 1914, France was a fading former giant (that’s Japan today); Britain was a waning superpower, no longer able to guarantee global security (that’s the US now); and Germany was an emerging industrial power huffing and puffing and making territorial claims (today, that’s China).

Rather than all out war, Marin Katusa, Casey’s chief energy investment strategist, believes the new “Colder War” will be fought by economic means, specifically through domination of the energy markets.
While Europe is using less oil than it did over a decade ago, says Katusa, it’s depending more on Russia for its energy. North Sea oil and gas production is in decline, and Norway’s production has reached a plateau and is dropping. Russia, on the other hand, owns 40% of the world’s conventional oil and gas reserves.

The solution, Katusa says, is the “European Energy Renaissance.” As Putin tightens the thumbscrews on his energy trading partners, more and more EU countries are waking up to the fact that they will have to produce their own energy to gain independence from Russia. As the best ways to play this new paradigm, Katusa recommends three undervalued North American companies that are in the thick of the action.

To get Marin Katusa’s timely stock picks (and those of the other speakers), as well as every single presentation of the Summit and all bonus files the speakers used, order your 26+-hour Summit Audio Collection now. They’re available in CD and/or MP3 format. Learn more here.

The article War, Peace, and Financial Fireworks was originally published at casey research

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The Age of Transformation

By John Mauldin

One of the many luxuries that my readers have afforded me over the years is their willingness to allow me to explore a wide variety of topics. Not all writers are so blessed, and their output and responses to it tend to stay focused on specific, often quite narrow topics. While this approach allows them to dig very deep into particular subject matter, it can reduce the total scope of their research, vision, and advice. But don’t get me wrong; these types of letters are very important. I benefit greatly from being a subscriber to a number of letters that give me detailed analysis for which I simply don’t have the time to do the research. There’s just too much going on in the world today for any of us to be an expert in more than a few areas.

I seem to find the most enjoyment and elicit the best response when I try to give my readers the benefit of my broad scope of reading and research as I try to figure out how all the various and sundry pieces of the puzzle fit together. For me, the world is just that: a vast and very complex puzzle. Trying to discern the grand themes and detailed patterns as the very pieces of the puzzle go on changing shape before my eyes is quite a challenge.

To try to figure out which puzzle pieces are going to have the most influence and impact in our immediate future, as opposed to languishing in the background, can be a frustrating experience. I often find myself writing about topics (such as a coming subprime crisis or recession) long before they manifest themselves. But I think it is important to see opportunities and problems brewing as far in advance as we can so that we can thoughtfully position ourselves and our portfolios to take advantage.

Today I offer some musings on what I’ve come to think of as the Age of Transformation (which I have been thinking about a lot while in Tuscany). I believe there are multiple and rapidly accelerating changes happening simultaneously (if you can think of 10 years as simultaneously) that are going to transform our social structures, our investment portfolios, and our personal futures. We have had such transformations in the past. The rise of the nation state, the steam engine, electricity, the advent of the social safety net, the personal computer, the internet, and the collapse of communism are just a few of the dozens of profound changes that have transformed the world in which we live.

Therefore, in one sense, these periods of transformation are nothing new. I think the difference today, however, is going to be the simultaneous nature of multiple transformational trends playing out within a very short period of time (relatively speaking) and at an accelerating rate.

It is self evident that failure to adapt to transformational trends will consign a business or a society to the ash can of history. Our history and business books are littered with thousands of such failures. I think we are entering one of those periods when failing to pay close attention to the changes going on around you could prove decidedly problematical for your portfolio and fatal to your business.

This week we’re going to develop a very high-level perspective on the Age of Transformation. In the coming years we will do a deep dive into various aspects of it, as this letter always has. But I think it will be very helpful for you to understand the larger picture of what is happening so that you can put specific developments into context – and, hopefully, let them work for you rather than against you.

We’re going to explore two broad themes, neither of which will be strange to readers of this letter. The first transformational theme that I see is the emerging failure of multiple major governments around the world to fulfill the promises they have made to their citizens. We have seen these failures at various times in recent years in “developed countries”; and while they may not have impacted the whole world, they were quite traumatic for the citizens involved. I’m thinking, for instance, of Canada and Sweden in the early ’90s. Both ran up enormous debts and had to restructure their social commitments. Talk to people who were involved in making those changes happen, and you can still see some 20 years later how painful that process was. When there are no good choices, someone has to make the hard ones.

I think similar challenges are already developing throughout Europe and in Japan and China, and will probably hit the United States by the end of this decade. While each country will deal with its own crisis differently, these crises are going to severely impact social structures and economies not just nationally but globally. Taken together, I think these emerging developments will be bigger in scope and impact than the credit crisis of 2008.

While each country’s crisis may seemingly have a different cause, the problems stem largely from the inability of governments to pay for promised retirement and health benefits while meeting all the other obligations of government. Whether that inability is due to demographic problems, fiscal irresponsibility, unduly high tax burdens, sclerotic labor laws, or a lack of growth due to bureaucratic restraints, the results will be the same. Debts are going to have to be “rationalized” (an economic euphemism for default), and promises are going to have to be painfully adjusted. The adjustments will not seem fair and will give rise to a great deal of societal Sturm und Drang, but at the end of the process I believe the world will be much better off. Going through the coming period is, however, going to be challenging.

“How did you go bankrupt?” asked Hemingway’s protagonist. “Gradually,” was the answer, “and then all at once.” European governments are going bankrupt gradually, and then we will have that infamous Bang! moment when it seems to happen all at once. Bond markets will rebel, interest rates will skyrocket, and governments will be unable to meet their obligations. Japan is trying to forestall their moment with the most breathtaking quantitative easing scheme in the history of the world, electing to devalue their currency as the primary way to cope. The U.S. has a window of time in which it will still be possible to deal with its problems (and I am hopeful that we can), but without structural reform of our entitlement programs we will go the way of Europe and numerous other countries before us.

The actual path that any of the countries will take (with the exception of Japan, whose path is now clear) is open for boisterous debate, but the longer there is inaction, the more disastrous the remaining available choices will be. If you think the Greek problem is solved (or the Spanish or the Italian or the Portuguese one), you are not paying attention. Greece will clearly default again. The “solutions” have so far produced outright depressions in these countries. What happens when France and Germany are forced to reconcile their own internal and joint imbalances? The adjustment will change consumption patterns and seriously impact the flow of capital and the global flow of goods.

This breaking wave of economic changes will not be the end of the world, of course – one way or another we’ll survive. But how you, your family, and your businesses are positioned to deal with the crisis will have a great deal to do with the manner in which you survive. We are not just cogs in a vast machine turning to powers we cannot control. If we properly prepare, we can do more than merely “survive.” But achieving that means you’re going to have to rely more on your own resources and ingenuity and less on governments. If you find yourself in a position where you are dependent upon the government for your personal situation, you might not be happy. This is not something that is going to happen all of a sudden next week, but it is going to unfold through various stages in various countries; and given the global nature of commerce and finance, as the song says, “There is no place to run and no place to hide.” You will be forced to adjust, either in a thoughtful and premeditated way or in a panicked and frustrated one. You choose.

I should add a note to those of my readers who think, “I don’t have to worry about all this because I am not dependent on Social Security.” Wrong. A significant majority of the retiring generation does depend on Social Security and also on government controlled healthcare, and their reactions and votes and consumption patterns will have an impact on society. Ditto for France, Germany, Italy, and the rest of Europe. The Japanese have evidently made their choice as to how to deal with their crisis. If you are a Japanese citizen and are not making preparations for a significant change in your national balance sheet and the value of your currency, you have your head in the sand.

There’s no question that the reactions of the various governments as they try to forestall the inevitable and manage the crisis will create turmoil and a great deal of volatility in the markets. We have not seen the last of QE in the U.S., but Japan is going gangbusters with it, and it is getting fired up in Europe and China.

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The article Thoughts from the Frontline: The Age of Transformation was originally published at Mauldin Economics

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A Yen for a Mortgage

By John Mauldin

For some time I have been saying that I was going to close the mortgage on my new apartment and then hedge it in yen. I promised to tell you the story, including what type of loan I got and how I am doing the hedge. This week I was finally able to pull the trigger. This topic will also let us re-examine why I think the Japanese yen is a screaming short. I am going to make this a shorter letter, as Amsterdam is calling, and it is a beautiful day. This is not a big think piece, but I think many of you will find it interesting. It outlines how I put my economic thinking into actual practice, and names names, if you will, of those who helped me do it.

A little background might be in order for those who want to know about the house. Others might skip to the next heading, An ARM and a Leg. I bought my last home in 1991 and sold it around 1998. I bought during the savings and loan crisis, which gave us the Resolution Trust Corporation, which sold me my hew home. I paid about 35% of the original asking price only two years earlier, at the high water mark, so I got a good deal. (Which was partially offset by the fact that I had to bring a check to the closing from the home I sold to get the new one.) Homes in some parts of Texas were literally being auctioned on the courthouse steps and paid for with credit cards.

For that home, I actually offered $50,000 less than several other offers on the table, but I attached a large nonrefundable cashier’s check, as a deposit, to the offer, while other bidders wanted the harried RTC clerk to make some much-needed repairs (the pool was green, fire ants had chewed through wiring, there had been flooding, etc.). But he had a monster stack of homes on his desk to sell, and my offer involved the least work, so he simply took it. I didn’t make all that much when I sold the home seven years later, by the way, but I did OK.

Rental properties in Texas at that time and up until recently have been good deals, in my opinion. For me, the cost of renting was much lower than the total cost of buying a home. About six years ago I moved to downtown Dallas after 40 years on the Fort Worth side of the metroplex. I moved first into a high rise (with some of the kids) and then later rented a larger home in Highland Park during the Great Recession, when larger homes simply couldn’t find buyers. It was stunningly cheap for the value. I was quite happy with my long term set up, but in January the owner called from California and offered to let me out of my lease if I would move in 45 days so he could sell the home in the spring. The market had finally come back, and homes in the “Park Cities” were selling within a few weeks of going on the market.

I was not really interesting in moving, but I had been to an apartment that a good friend of mine (David Tice of Prudent Bear fame) had renovated, in what is called the Uptown area of Dallas. He bought two apartments on the 22^nd floor of a high rise, basically taking the whole south side, then knocked down interior walls and made one large, open apartment He really did it quite nicely. I fell in love with his place, which is rather unusual for me, as I have been in fabulous homes all over the world; and while I admired many of them, none had ever “spoken” to me. But the views of downtown Dallas and the surrounding area just seemed so full of energy to me; and as a writer, I need to feel the energy. It recharges me. (I know, some people want beaches or mountains or a cave, and I have written this letter from many corners of the planet, but I do like a place with energy.)

So I called David’s realtor. Amazingly, two adjoining apartments were just coming on the market. They were basically apartments that had been bought on spec during the crisis, and the market had now come back enough that the owners were ready to sell. One of the apartments had never been lived in or rented. They were the two three bedroom apartments on the east side of the building, but they had the downtown views as well as northern ones.

Dallas has plenty of high rises, but oddly there are very few larger apartments except for penthouses. And the penthouses command a LARGE premium for what is still just basically floor space. I checked all the local similar offerings to get an idea of relative value, and I again put in a below market offer for the two apartments. After a lot of negotiating by my realtor, Nancy Guerriero, my offer was accepted. Then the hard part began, and that was getting a mortgage. Because I was going to renovate and because there was a tenant in one of the apartments, I could not get anything like a traditional mortgage. My mortgage broker, Ron Schulz, must have shopped several dozen banks. Basically, banks don’t like high rises and homeowners’ associations, as their local experience has not been good. Without going into details, I had to get three different loans to do the deal, and finally got help from a local banker, Joe Goyne, president of Pegasus Bank. Joe is a throwback to the old personal bankers we used to have here in Texas.

We started on the design almost as soon as I committed to the place. I was lucky in that my niece, Jen Mauldin, had trained with one of the largest architectural design firms in the country and done major design projects all over the world (the estates of Abu Dhabi princes, commercial developments in Macau, high roller suites in Vegas, Ritz Carltons, etc., plus lots of very nice homes). She had gone out on her own and was available. We set budgets and timelines. (Cue laughing from all my friends. They were right to laugh.) The planned 120 days of construction stretched into 180+ days – and forget about the budgets. Then there was the shock when it developed that new mortgage rules basically meant that I had to go to a 70% loan instead of the 80% I had been told I would get.

Plus, I was a rookie and did not check a “small” detail. I asked if I could get my construction costs rolled into the new loan. The answer was yes, but what they meant was that I could get the construction loans rolled in but not my out-of-pocket costs, because Texas has a law that you cannot get money out of your mortgage when you refinance, and what I paid out of pocket was considered getting money back. Oops – I had paid a lot out of pocket just to move things along, when I should have gone to Joe and upped my construction loan. Silly me.

All told, I had to come up with way more cash than I thought I would when I started. The difference was large enough that I would not have done the deal if I had known. But I really like my place, so in a sense I am glad that I didn’t know. (You can see some of the work on the place at Jen’s website.)

An ARM and a Leg 

But then came the time to get a takeout mortgage. Joe had lent me the total amount at 3.75% for one year.
It soon became apparent I would get only a 70% loan, which would basically take me out of the construction loans. I got lucky in that the appraisals turned out higher than my cost basis, as values have actually moved up. First feelers were not encouraging, so I began to shop.

I wanted a 5 year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) with a 30 year amortization. My feeling is that there will be a recession within the next five years (if we do not have one, it will be the longest span on record with no recession in the US) and that rates will once more go way down – and I can then lock in whatever I want, probably a 15 year fixed, at that time. My risk is that we may never again see rates as low as they are today, but that is a chance I am prepared to take. (I really do eat my own “cooking.”)

Two personal connections turned up offers in the 4.5% range. Ron was beginning to get feelers in the high 3% range. I called my broker at JP Morgan (more below), and Travis Moss in his office went to work and got me an offer for the 5 year ARM at 2.875%; but it was not clear they could actually do the deal, as high-rise financing is complicated in Texas. About that time, my regular bank, Capital One, changed loan officers. The new guy gave me a courtesy call; and upon finding that I needed a mortgage, he jumped into the process. Rather than a loan that they would securitize, they were looking for a loan to put on the books.

They matched the JP Morgan offer and really dropped the closing costs. No points, etc. I sheepishly told Travis (who is a friend) that I was getting a better offer, and within a day he had matched it. We decided to go with JP Morgan, as that is where I am going to do my yen hedge, but it was hard to turn down Clinton Coe from Capital One. He really wanted that loan. When we had our crisis in Texas back in the early ’90s, we “lost” our banks to national banks and lost a lot of that personal touch I had known for the first part of my career. It is nice to see bankers like that again in Texas.

I signed the closing papers and had literally just stood up from the table when I took a call from the banker at Capital One, offering to cut the rate to 2.75% and axe a few other costs as well. WOW. Now, in Texas you can cancel a loan commitment for up to three days. I was tempted for a minute, but decided that because I had told Travis I would do the deal, I was not willing to take that back. But I did call Travis and tell him what had happened, joking about it. He said “wait a minute.” He hung up, then quickly called me back and said, “We will match it. Go cancel your loan.” When was the last time your banker tore up your loan and then lowered the rate for you five minutes after you signed the deal?

So I rescinded the first loan and then had to wait another 30 days (the rules) but finally closed on the way to the airport to come to Amsterdam.

A Yen for Mortgages

Long-time readers know I am a huge bear on the relative value of the Japanese yen versus almost any currency, but especially the dollar. I have been saying for some time that I expect the yen to one day be at 200 and maybe even higher. But that journey is going to take a long time. Forty years ago the yen was at 357 (or thereabouts), and then it rose over time to the high ’70s last year, when it started to fall again. The chart below goes back 43 years. Think, by the way, how your businesses would react if the value of the currency in which you trade rose by a factor of four over 40 years.



Later in the letter I will go more into my reasoning as to why I think the yen will fall over time, but for now let’s look at how I got a “yen mortgage.”

I asked readers to help me find a “pure” yen mortgage. I said I thought the market for such a mortgage would be huge, and I would help build it. I must admit, I was somewhat surprised when nothing really turned up. Ten year government paper in Japan is at 0.6%. You would think that getting 2% for a 15 year mortgage would appeal to someone, but running a few connections still brought me nothing. I even found a U.S. bank that would agree to a takeout and mortgage guarantee, but still no takers. I guess a billion isn’t as big a deal as it used to be.

The basic concept is that if the yen falls by 50% (my bet) and I have my loan structured in yen, then I pay less in dollars. Perhaps a lot less. But since no pure yen loan is available that I can find, a synthetic one will have to do.

There are lots of ways to do it. Futures are the obvious way – simply selling the yen short. But I have no way of knowing timing on the yen, and in my view there will be some significant “corrections” along the way, so using futures would be a constant battle of margins, rolling into forwards, paying commissions with every new contract, etc. And given the new Dodd-Frank rules, it is #$%W$#$ hard to simply tell a broker to execute a trade. To do the trade I ended up doing (see below), I had to be on the phone in the middle of the Amsterdam night to verbally confirm that I was sane and really, really did want to do the trade. But given my travel schedule and possible technological issues, updating my futures trade could have been problematic.

So I elected to keep it simple and do a 10 year put option. I want Abe-san and Kuroda-san to pay for about half my mortgage. I will gladly pay the other half. All they have to do is print yen to fulfill their part of the transaction – and they seem pretty committed.

Warning: Don’t try this at home, kids. This is a VERY risky bet, even though my losses are limited to my entire investment. And while my logic might be compelling, at the end of the day I am trading/betting/gambling (all essentially the same thing) that politicians in a country and a culture I don’t live in and don’t truly understand are going to act in a certain way. They might choose another path with different disastrous results that would make the trade go against me. They have no good choices, only disastrous ones, because they have overleveraged their government and cannot possibly meet their obligations without some kind of default. Rather than outright default to their own retirees, I think they will print and inflate and monetize away that debt. But that’s just me making a trade to counter what I think they will do (and what they tell us they will do). With that preface, let’s look at what I am doing.

To execute the trade, I went to The Plumber. That is my rather affectionate name for Erick Kuebler, a JP Morgan broker here in Dallas. Darrell Cain introduced us, with a rather effusive (for Darrell) endorsement. Having met a few brokers over the years, including some really good ones, I just listened and watched. But as Erick is part of that downtown TCU-grad mafia (a local thing – he was in the same frat with Kyle Bass and a group of guys), he kept showing up at places where I was.

Over time, I realized that Erick understood the workings of the market better than anyone I personally knew. Not the normal things you and I think about, but what really happens when you execute a trade. I simply want to go to a screen and buy or sell, in much the same way that I go to a faucet and turn it on and get water. I expect water to come out when I twist the handle.

The Plumber knows what happens when I do that. He knows where the water comes from, who purifies it, what tank it was stored in before it got to me, whether it will be hot or cold, and what the pressure is. He knows whether to use copper or PVC pipe in the construction. He knows who charges what at each step along the line. I have learned a lot from The Plumber. (Simple ETF trades, for instance, are not all that simple. Especially in size.) For the record, I am a registered broker with my own firm, and you would think I would know this stuff. I kind of knew but had no real idea how many toll gates there are if you are not paying attention. Erick specializes in larger trades for clients trying to avoid those tolls. He laughs at the HFT guys.

Plus, Darrell chose Erick and JP Morgan to handle my self-directed defined-benefit pensions plans (which deserve a whole letter – for the right small business they are a marvelous tax preference vehicle), so Erick was the logical choice to help me do this yen trade.

Buying “in-the-money” or close-to-spot options is expensive. While I have no way to know what the yen will be one or two years from now, I truly think that over ten years Japan has no choice but to print massively.

So, if I think the yen will eventually get to 200, I can buy an option that allows me to exercise the put at a strike price of 130. If I do a million dollars notional, that means if the yen goes to 200 I make about $700,000. The rules keep me from disclosing how much that put option costs me, but let’s just say that I end up with a nice multiple if I’m right.

Of course, if the market is right (in its current state of unwavering faith) and the yen doesn’t even top 130, I lose all of my option premium. ALL OF IT. 100%.

I will eventually add two more trades, one option at 140 and another at 150, but as I am notoriously bad at timing, I am going to “feather” those trades in over the next few months. I can see the yen dropping below 100 or going above 105 quickly (it is at 102 and change today); but since I don’t know, it just seems better to me to take some time to put the whole trade on. I now have until May 5, 2024, for the yen to rise above 130 … or I take the loss.

Given that I think 200 is where we’re going – it doesn’t really matter all that much if we start at 98 or 105; but I think that in general it’s good practice to pace your investments when it’s practical to do so.

A Bug In Search of a Windshield

I wrote about four years ago that Japan was a bug in search of a windshield. In January 2013 I actually started to invest personal assets in the “short Japan” story (mainly through funds), and with this week’s action I’m doing so more aggressively. The position represents an outsized portion of my personal portfolio, and it’s one I would not suggest that most people take in such size. But then, you ask, why am I doing it?

I guess I’m a true believer. Japan has a government debt-to-GDP ratio of at least 221% and perhaps as high as 245%, depending on your data source and how you account for certain securities. The interest rates on the Japanese 10-year bond is at 0.6%, yet interest-rate expenses eat up some 23% of total government revenue. (Debt service accounts for 46% of government tax revenue.) If interest rates were to rise to OECD levels, or another 2%, interest-rate expense would eat up 80% of government revenue. That is not a workable business model.

My friends over at Hayman Advisors (Kyle Bass’s fund) sent me the following pieces of data: Added together, Japanese debt service and social security (nondiscretionary spending) exceed government tax revenue and have done so for each of the last five years. The fiscal deficit has been greater than 10% of nominal GDP in each of the last five years. Japan has ~¥1.1 quadrillion of total government debt (~¥1,100 trillion) compared to nominal GDP of~¥481 trillion (a 221% ratio).

Japan has consumed the savings of multiple generations through the sale of government bonds. Japan now has less than 5% of its government debt sourced outside Japan. But the country does not “owe it to itself.” It owes it to the tens of millions of savers and retirees who have played the game correctly, worked hard and saved all their lives, and now want to use those savings in retirement.

The largest pension funds are no longer net buyers of Japanese bonds (JGBs). They are now selling, and that tide to swell with a vengeance, since Japan is rapidly aging. Further, the largest pension funds are starting to roll out of JGBs and into equities. Which makes sense, as who wants to own a 10-year JGB at 0.6% if inflation rises to 2%? What rational investor would choose to do that?

Japan cannot afford interest rates to rise all that much. So there must be a good market for JGBs. But who will buy?

Two weeks ago, there was a day and a half when the Bank of Japan was not in the market for 10-year JGBs. Even though they are buying in size every month with their latest aggressive round of QE, there are times when they are not “in the market.”

During my recent speeches, I have been asking the room how many JGBs they think traded during the period when the BoJ was out of the picture. Make your guess now.

No one gets it right. For that day and a half, the bond market had zero trades. The Bank of Japan is now the market. Think about that! (See: reuters.com/japan-jgb.)

Given the reality of Japanese finance, I think they BoJ will continue to “hit the bid” in order to hold interest rates down. They will space out their buying more to keep those no-trading days out of public view. They will give us a song and dance from time to time to try and keep the valuation of the yen from rising too fast, but in the end they are going to monetize more in absolute terms than the U.S. did in an economy three times Japan’s size. Perhaps as much as $8 trillion over an extended period. That’s the relative equivalent of the US Fed buying $30 trillion and putting it on its balance sheet. If you thought the Fed was going to do that, what would you do now?

What do you think Japanese investors will do when they realize what is happening? Buy equities, of course, but also diversify internationally. This move is going to play havoc with cross border capital flows into all sorts of markets.

This is a brief synopsis of the Japan story. For a much fuller read, I point you to some of my past letters, or better yet, the full story in chapters two and three of Code Red.

I urge you to be cautious about putting on a “yen hedge” for your own mortgage. It is hard to do and more expensive for options with a notional value of less than $1 million, so it might not fit into your portfolio all that well. Talk with your financial advisor or broker, and really do your own homework. There are very smart people who, like me, are yen bears but who think that 140 or 150 is about as high as the yen will go. When I start talking 200, they think I’m smoking some of the stuff sold in the coffee shops here in Amsterdam . If they’re right, my trade will be in the money but not all that good over time, considering the risk and use of capital.

Amsterdam, Brussels, Geneva, San Diego, and Tuscany

I am in Amsterdam today, and it is beautiful. I will soon be off to the new ship museum and other sites before – if all goes well – I rent a car and take a leisurely Sunday drive through the countryside to Brussels, something I have always wanted to do. I may try to get lost, at least for a few hours. Who knows what I might stumble on?

I will be speaking Monday night in Brussels for my good friend Geert Wellens of Econopolis Wealth Management before we fly to Geneva for another speech with his firm, and of course there will be the usual meetings with clients and friends. I find Geneva the most irrationally expensive city I travel to, and the current exchange rates don’t suggest it will be any different this time.

I come back for a few days before heading to San Diego and my Strategic Investment Conference, cosponsored with Altegris. I have spent time with each of the speakers over the last few weeks, going over their topics; and I have to tell you, I am like a kid in a candy store – about as excited as I can get. This is going to be one incredible conference. You really want to make an effort to get there; but if you can’t, be sure to listen to the audio CDs. You can get a discounted rate by purchasing prior to the conference.

I had lunch today with Eddy Markus, the founder and chief economist of ECR, one of the more respected research shops that analyze European credit and currency markets. We have communicated over the years, and he politely sends me a note every so often to broaden my limited understanding of the world. I always listen.

Eddy has a somewhat different view of the problems facing Europe. He and I see the same issues (debt, impossible-to-keep government promises, no fiscal union, banking capitalization woes, etc.), but he thinks the euro will break up, not in just a few years but much further down the road, in ten years, perhaps. It is his view that the dream of a unified Europe will be chased by politicians all the way to the bitter end. They will kick the can down the road much further than some of us think possible. He believes they can hold it together longer with promises and halfway measures, promises to fix things at the next meeting, etc. I admit to wondering just how they can accomplish that, and we spent a few pleasant hours over lunch on the canals as he explained his views.

Ten years? Wow. A lot of things will change in 10 years, but Keynes is right about this: the markets can stay irrational longer than you can remain solvent. I find it hard to believe that France can stall that long; but then again, we are talking politics, not economics.

It really is time to hit the send button. Have a great week. I am off to ponder how human beings could pile into such small ships and dare the oceans. (I get seasick relatively easily and find a storm at sea to be such an awful idea that I have a hard time even thinking about getting on a boat.) I therefore find it fascinating that it seemed like a good idea at the time and that so many did it. But then again, I am shorting the yen – who knows what craziness true believers will get up to?

Your still trying to think about Europe in 10 years analyst,
John Mauldin

The article Thoughts from the Frontline: A Yen for a Mortgage was originally published at Mauldin Economics

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